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I. INTRODUCTION
The American tax system imposes a double tax on the profits of
corporations. This two-tier taxation is unusual,! unfair,2 and inefficient. The
ill-effects of the double tax are well known in Washington. Congress regularly
considers legislation to eliminate the double tax by integrating the personal and
corporate taxes into a single system. These initiatives have had the support of
1. The United States is one of the few industrialized countries to impose full double taxation on
corporate profits. See, e.g., Charles E. M&Lure, Jr., Where Tax Reform Went Astray, 31 VILL. L. REv. 1619,
1631 (1986).
2. The double tax violates the principle of vertical equity because it imposes a single corporate rate
on corporate profits regardless of whether these profits are ultimately attributable to high-income or low-
income taxpayers. Charles E. McLure, Jr., Integration of the Personal and Corporate Income Taxes: The
Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals, 88 HARv. L. REv. 532, 539 (1975); see also id. at
533-41 (refuting arguments made in support of double taxation). But see Jeffrey Kwall, The Uncertain
Case Against the Double Taxation of Corporate Income, 68 N.C. L. REV. 613, 633-41 (1990). Some
observers argue that the double tax also violates the principle of horizontal equity: Because dividends are
taxed differently from other income, the double tax results in similarly situated individuals bearing different
tax burdens. McLure, supra, at 538-39; see Kwall, supra, at 633-43. However, unlike vertical inequities,
horizontal inequities are often arbitraged away by the market price mechanism.
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tax scholars, the Treasury, the public, and several Presidents. Yet proposals to
integrate the tax system invariably die a quiet death.
The persistence of the double-level tax is puzzling. To be sure, the tax
code contains many provisions in desperate need of revision. Typically,
though, these provisions are supported by a well-organized interest group that
lobbies vigorously to retain its cherished preference. The corporate tax, in
contrast, appears to benefit no one directly and to hurt the corporate sector,
which is large, well organized, and generally able to defend its own interests.
Nor does the double tax persist because of public support. Opinion polls
regularly show public opposition to double taxation.
In this Article, we argue that the resilience of the corporate tax is a
manifestation of the most enduring source of problems in corporate law, the
separation between ownership and control of large corporations. Large
corporations might be expected to lead the fight against the double tax. Their
managers, however, have chosen not to lobby vigorously for integration, even
though shareholders often would benefit from integration. In this managerial
diffidence lies the key to explaining the failure of integration efforts.
Managers' lack of interest in integration, we argue, results from the fact
that managers and shareholders pursue different objectives when firm
ownership is separated from control. Shareholder objectives are served both by
new investments and by higher returns on old investments. Managerial
objectives, in contrast, are served primarily by new investments. This
difference in objectives leads shareholders and managers to have different
views on corporate investments and on tax policy. Shareholders benefit both
from measures such as integration that provide windfalls to their existing
shares and from measures such as accelerated depreciation (ACRS) and
investment tax credits (ITCs) that increase the return on new investments.
Managers, in contrast, benefit only from policies that stimulate new
investment. Thus, while many managers support integration, they would rather
devote corporate resources to lobbying for tax preferences, such as ACRS and
the ITC, that encourage new investment.4
The separation of ownership and control may have an even more
surprising consequence. Some managers, we argue, may actively oppose
integration because the double tax serves their interests. These managers may
support the double tax for one of the very reasons that reformers oppose it:
Double taxation traps earnings in the corporation. This retained earnings trap
3. Any income tax system must allow firms to deduct the cost of capital through depreciation
allowances. By permitting taxpayers to take these deductions earlier than economically warranted,
accelerated depreciation methods (Accelerated Cost Recovery System or ACRS) provide a tax break for
capital investment.
4. Interestingly, this divergence between managers and shareholders advances overall economic
efficiency; economists are as unenthusiastic as managers about windfalls from tax reforms.
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enables managers to pursue investments from which they benefit at the expense
of shareholders.
Understanding the failure of past reform efforts is key to the success of
future efforts. Managers have been the only vocal public participants in earlier
debates. Reformers, we believe, must secure the support of managers in their
quest for integration. Managers, in our view, can be persuaded to support
integration by the introduction of proposals that avoid windfalls and, perhaps,
those that lock in earnings.
Part II examines alternative explanations of the double tax, including
various populist arguments. Parts III and IV examine our hypothesis that the
separation of ownership and control explains managerial apathy-and
sometimes antipathy-towards integration. Part In examines why most
managers have so little enthusiasm for integration: Integration provides a
windfall for existing equity, whereas managers would prefer to lobby for tax
preferences that promote new investment. Part IV explains why some managers
actively oppose integration. Finally, Part V employs our analysis to explore
strategies that future reformers might use.
11. WHY A CORPORATE TAX?
Under the Internal Revenue Code, the profits of most corporations are, in
theory, subject to a two-tier tax.' Each year a corporation's profits are taxed
at the corporate level according to a corporate rate schedule.6 Any earnings
distributed immediately to shareholders as dividends are taxed again as
ordinary income at personal rates.7 Earnings that are retained by the
corporation escape double taxation only temporarily. As these retained earnings
generate profits, the new profits are taxed at the corporate level. These
earnings are taxed again at the shareholder level when they are distributed or
when a shareholder sells his shares.
The corporate tax creates significant efficiency losses.8 Some of these
losses occur because the tax is effective. By lowering the return to corporate
capital,9 the corporate tax discourages investment in the corporate sector.'
5. See I.R.C. §§ 301-381 (1988) (subchapter C); cf id. §§ 1361-1375 (1988) (subchapter S) (imposing
a single tax on certain closely held corporations).
6. Id. § 11 (West 1995).
7. Id. §§ I, 61(a)(7) (West 1995).
8. E.g., AMERICAN LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL
AND CORPORATE INCOME TAXES 21-46 (1993) (Alvin Warren, Reporter) [hereinafter AMERICAN LAW
INST., INTEGIRATION] (summarizing defects of double tax); George F. Break, Corporate Tax Integration:
Radical Revisionism or Common Sense?, in FEDERAL TAX REFORM: MYTHs & REALITIES 55, 60-63
(Michael J. Boskin ed., 1978) (same); Alvin Warren, The Relation and Integration of the Individual and
Corporate Income Taxes, 94 HARV. L. REV. 717, 721-38 (1981); Eric Zolt, Corporate Taxation After the
Tax Reform Act of 1986: A State of Disequilibrium, 66 N.C. L. REV. 839, 841-44, 858-68 (1988).
9. There is considerable controversy over who bears the burden of the corporate tax, especially in the
long run. Although initially the burden of the corporate tax falls on corporate shareholders, the tax burden
may shift, in part or in whole, from corporate shareholders to others, such as labor, firm customers, or
[Vol. 105: 325
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This may reduce efficiency by lowering output in industries that find a
corporate form of organization particularly suitable." Other losses occur
because corporations can avoid the tax, but only by using evasive strategies
that impose new social costs. Corporations can, for instance, reduce the burden
of the double tax by retaining and reinvesting earnings rather than paying them
out as dividends. This strategy will often produce suboptimal investment
policies that injure shareholders. 2 Corporations can also reduce the double
tax by financing investment with debt rather than equity, since only corporate
equity is subject to the double tax. In so doing, however, a corporation may
raise its risk of bankruptcy to inefficient levels. 3
The double tax, moreover, is inconsistent with currently accepted views of
tax equity. 4 Most contemporary academics regard the corporation as simply
a conduit of profits to shareholders and thus see it as an inappropriate unit of
taxation.' 5
capital generally. Most would agree, however, that capital does bear some part of the tax. See Thomas
Griffith, Integration of the Corporate and Personal Income Taxes and the ALI Proposals, 23 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 715, 728-31 (1983) (concluding that theoretical and empirical literature favors hypothesis that, at
least in short run, corporate shareholders bear burden of double tax); Arnold C. Harberger, The Incidence
of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. POL. ECON. 215, 215-17 (1962). See generally William A. Klein,
The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax: A Lawyer's View of a Problem in Economics, 1965 Wis.
L. REV. 576, 581-87 (discussing incidence of corporate tax); Laurence Kotlikoff & Lawrence Summers,
Tax Incidence, in 2 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1043, 1085-86 (AJ. Auerbach & M. Feldstein eds.,
1987) (same); John K. McNulty, Corporate Income Tax Reform in the United States: Proposals for
Integration of the Corporate and Individual Income Taxes, and International Aspects, 12 INT'L TAX & Bus.
LAW. 161, 257-59 (1994) (discussing controversy over who bears burden of corporate tax). This is
particularly true in the "short run," when the supply of capital is relatively fixed. See Kotlikoff & Summers,
supra, at 1082. But see MARIAN KRZYZANIAK & RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE SHIFTING OF THE
CORPORATE INCOME TAX, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF ITS SHORT-RUN EFFECT UPON THE RATE OF RETURN
(1963). Moreover, this short-run effect may last for a substantial period of time; for example, some argue
that the adjustment process following a structural tax change is 50 years. Kotlikoff & Summers, supra, at
1079-81.
10. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INST., INTEGRATION, supra note 8, at 22-25; DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ON INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND
CORPORATE TAX SYms: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE 125-28 (1992) [hereinafter DEPARTMENT OF
THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION]; CHARLES E. MCLURE, MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TWICE? 26,
146-48 (1979); Warren, supra note 8, at 732-33.
11. See Break, supra note 8, at 60-63; Harberger, supra note 9 (asserting that in long run corporate
tax will shift capital away from corporate sector). Moreover, firms cannot always avoid the double tax by
organizing as large limited partnerships because publicly traded limited partnerships are often taxed as
corporations.
12. See Break, supra note 8, at 62-63; infra Part IV (discussing retained earnings trap).
13. See AMERICAN LAW INST., INTEGRATION, supra note 8, at 25-28; DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY, INTEGRATION, supra note 10, at 115-16; Break, supra note 8, at 61-62. Indeed, concern about
excessive leveraging has been one of the driving forces behind integration efforts. See Corporate Taxes:
Treasury Official, JCT Head Review Corporate Integration Approaches, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA)
No. 25, at G-9 (Feb. 6, 1990) [hereinafter Corporate Taxes] (quoting Joint Committee on Taxation Chief
of Staff Ronald Pearlman as saying that partial integration would resolve problems created by debt-equity
distinction); Rick Pullen, Bush Moves Slowly on LBOs, WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY, Feb. 8, 1990, at 12.
14. See supra note 2; see also infra Section II.D (noting that public opinion does not support double
taxation of corporate profits).
15. See, e.g., William A. Klein, Income Taxation and Legal Entities, 20 UCLA L. REv. 13, 13-16,
43-57, 73-74 (1972). See generally Griffith, supra note 9, at 717-22. This does not mean that academics
universally reject the corporate tax. A few academics recently have attempted to justify the corporate tax
on grounds unrelated to the separate entity theory, including economic efficiency. These defenses of the
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Integration would considerably reduce many of the problems created by
double taxation.16 It thus has long had the enthusiastic backing of academic
observers, professional groups, 7 various Treasury Department reports,' 8 and
several presidential administrations. 19 Members of both houses of Congress
have introduced a steady stream of bills to integrate the tax system. 20
Nonetheless, the double tax persists.
corporate tax, however, generally are defenses of a corporate-level tax, not a two-tier tax. See Hideki Kanda
& Saul Levmore, Taxes, Agency Costs and the Price of Incorporation, 77 VA. L. REV. 211, 227, 233-36
(1991); Saul Levmore, The Positive Role of Tax Law in Corporate and Capital Markets, in CORPORATE
LAW AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 255 (Lucian Arye Bebchuk ed., 1990); Edward McCaffery, Cognitive
Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1861, 1883-86 (1994); see also infra Section ll.A (discussing populist
explanations for the double tax). Others regard the corporate tax as a remedy for other imperfections in the
tax system. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Rudnick, Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?, 39
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965, 971-72, 1099-1143 (1988-89) (proposing double tax on liquidity, although
only as second-best approach).
16. Throughout this Article we use the term "integration" to refer to both full and partial integration.
See infra text following note 37 (discussion full and partial integration plans).
17. See AMERICAN LAW INST., INTEGRATION, supra note 8; AMERICAN LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME
TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER C, PROPOSALS ON CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND DISPOSITIONS ADOPTED BY
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AT WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 13, 1980 AND REPORTER'S STUDY ON
CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS 354-400, 514 (1982) (William D. Andrews, Reporter); AMERICAN LAW INST.,
FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, REPORTER'S STUDY DRAFr-SUBCHAPTER C (SUPPLEMENTAL STUDY)
(1989) (William D. Andrews, Reporter) [hereinafter AMERICAN LAW INST., REPORTER'S STUDY DRAFT];
TAX DIVISION, AMERICAN INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, INTEGRATION OF THE CORPORATE AND
SHAREHOLDER TAX SYSTEMS (1993).
18. See DAVID F. BRADFORD & U.S. TREASURY TAX POLICY STAFF, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX
REFORM 4-5, 171 (2d ed. 1984) (slightly revised edition of 1977 Treasury Report of same name)
(endorsing full integration); DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION, supra note 10, at 15, 61-62,
89-92, 120-52 (leaning towards dividend-exclusion plan or comprehensive business income tax);
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, A RECOMMENDATION FOR INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND
CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS 2-5 (1992) (endorsing reinvestment dividend-exclusion plan); 2 DEPARTMENT
OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 136-37 (1984)
[hereinafter TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS] (proposing phased-in dividend-deduction system).
19. During the Ford administration, Treasury Secretary William Simon proposed corporate tax
integration. See Tax Reform: Public Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3857-58 (1975) [hereinafter Ways and Means Hearings] (testimony of William Simon, Secretary
of the Treasury). The proposal was reiterated in Tax Reform Act of 1975: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 70-77 (1976) [hereinafter Finance Hearings] (testimony of
William Simon, Secretary of the Treasury). The Carter administration seriously considered making an
integration proposal. See PETER H. ARANSON, INTERNATIONAL INST. FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, ORIGINAL
PAPER No. 7, THE MULTIPLE TAX ON CORPORATE INCOME 45 (1977); JOHN F. WI=TE, THE POLITICS AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 204-05 (1985); Tax Reform Option Papers Prepared by
Treasury Department, September 2, 1977, for the White House, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 196,
at 48-53 (Special Supp., Oct. 7, 1977) [hereinafter Tax Reform Option Papers]. Ronald Reagan supported
integration, Norman Jonas, That Wasn't Really a Gaffe on Corporate Taxes, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 14, 1983,
at 38, 38, and the Treasury under him issued supportive reports. See, e.g., TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS,
supra note 18, at 136-37 (proposing phased-in dividend deduction system).
20. In 1978, Representative Al Ullman introduced legislation that would have partially integrated the
corporate tax. See 124 CONG. REC. 2132-34 (1978) (proposal of Rep. Ullman); 124 CONG. REC. 7978-80
(1978) (statement of Rep. Ullman). Other Bills include S. 1700, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (Simon); H.R.
948, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (Regula); H.R. 669, 103d Cong., ist Sess. (1993) (Dornan); S. 3102,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (Simon); H.R. 663, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (Doman); H.R. 4707, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (Campbell); H.R. 4457, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (Vander Jagt); S. 1161, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (Shelby); H.R. 1052, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (Doman); H.R. 3668, 100th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1987) (Doman); H.R. 6436, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), 130 CONG. REC. 31708 (1984)
(Shannon); H.R. 1445, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), 127 CONG. REC. 1170 (1981) (Sawyer).
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The continued vitality of the double tax has puzzled many observers. A
number of scholars have offered explanations for the persistence of the double
tax that do not recognize the central role of agency costs. In this part, we will
explore these alternative theories. Any theory of corporate taxation, we believe,
must explain three facts. First, public corporations are subject to a double tax.
Second, although Congress has not integrated the tax system, it regularly
enacts other tax measures that reduce the tax burdefi on corporations. Finally,
publicly held corporations have not lobbied for integration. No argument that
ignores agency costs, we believe, explains all three of these facts.
A. Populist Entity Theory
Many scholars have suggested that the double tax persists because the
public supports it.2 These explanations for voter support of double taxation
can be loosely characterized as populist.
In one view, the double tax persists because the public views corporations
as distinct entities, not merely as vehicles for transferring profits to
shareholders. According to this theory, the public supports the double tax
because it believes that all individuals, including corporations, should pay taxes
on their income.22
The entity theory was indeed the original basis for imposing a separate
corporate tax,23 and it may in part-though only in part-characterize the
public's view of corporations. Yet even if the public completely accepted
it, the entity theory cannot explain all of the stylized facts of corporate
taxation. The entity theory can only explain why two levels of tax would be
imposed. It has nothing to say about why Congress regularly reduces the
burden of corporate taxation through ACRS instead of integration, or why
corporations have lobbied more heavily for ACRS than for integration.
B. Rational Populism
Another populist explanation treats the corporate tax as simply another tax
on capital. Voters, in this view, favor the corporate tax because they believe
21. See, e.g., ARANSON, supra note 19, at 34-35; Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public
Interest. A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 60-61 (1990); see also Barry Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate
Bankruptcy 45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 345-46 (1993) (suggesting that populist concerns might explain why
interest is deductible but dividends are not); Corporate Taxes, supra note 13, at G-9 (reporting Joint
Committee on Taxation Chief of Staff Ronald Pearlman's suggestion that double taxation is political
necessity).
22. Shaviro, supra note 21, at 60-61.
23. See, e.g., MERVYN KING, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE CORPORATION 50 (1977).
24. Poll data on public opinion suggests that the public does not fully accept the entity theory. See
infra Section II.D.
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that the tax falls on owners of capital; they do not themselves own significant
amounts of capital;25 and they feel that those who do should be taxed.26
This populist account of the persistence of the double tax fails to explain
any of the three fundamental facts. First, even if correct, this argument would
at most explain why corporate capital is taxed, but not why profits to capital
are taxed twice.27 Second, it cannot account for why Congress rejects
integration while regularly enacting sweeping capital tax cuts in the form of
ACRS, corporate rate reductions, and capital gains cuts. 28 Finally, it fails to
explain why corporate managers lobby more vigorously for ACRS and related
cuts than for integration.
C. Congress and Hidden Taxes
Some commentators have argued that the corporate tax persists because it
serves congressional objectives. The most common variation on this theme is
the "hidden tax" argument: The corporate tax is a politically expedient way of
raising revenue because the public does not understand that it ultimately bears
the burden of the tax.29
One version of the hidden-tax argument suggests that taxpayers regard
themselves as owners of capital but do not understand that they, as
shareholders, pay the corporate tax. This explanation has all the shortcomings
of the rational-populist hypothesis. First, it might explain the corporate tax, but
it does not explain the additional tax on dividends. Indeed, if voters regard
themselves as shareholders, Congress could better hide the tax burden by
integrating the tax system, imposing the entire burden directly on corporations,
25. In 1988, only 21.8% of American households owned corporate shares. JUDITH EARGLE, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-70, No. 22, HOUSEHOLD WEALTH AND ASSET
OWNERSHIP: 1988, at 2 (1990). Moreover, although a significant percentage of the population is covered
by a pension, most pensions are defined-benefit plans in which employees have no stake in the return.
26. Cf. Marjorie Komhauser, The Morality of Money: American Attitudes Toward Wealth and the
Income Tax, 70 IND. L.J. 119, 19-22, 144-54 (1994) (noting implications for taxation of Americans'
conflicting views about wealth and equality); Shaviro, supra note 21, at 57, 60-61 (arguing that people
prefer to pay as little tax themselves as possible, and also wish for wealthy people to "pay their 'fair
share"').
27. See also McNulty, supra note 9, at 174 (arguing that possible public belief that shareholders are
rich and should be taxed at high rates does not provide policy support for taxing only dividend income at
high rates and noting that, moreover, many shareholders are not rich).
28. The 1976 Tax Reform Bill did not include Treasury Secretary William Simon's integration
proposal, but it did significantly expand ITCs. See WITE, supra note 19, at 187, 190-98 (quoting various
Senators who characterized bill as creating loopholes for lobbied interests). In 1978, Congress did not adopt
Ullman's integration proposal, but passed the 1978 Tax Reform Act, which dramatically increased the tax
benefits to new capital. Id. at 204-17.
29. See ARANSON, supra note 19, at 34-36 (proposing this explanation for corporate tax); see also
McCaffery, supra note 15, at 1883-86 (employing cognitive psychology to argue that hidden nature of
corporate tax is reason to retain it); Shaviro, supra note 21, at 60-61 (describing public misunderstanding
of corporate taxation). Congress itself might not understand that the public bears the burden of the tax, but
this seems unlikely. The double tax on corporate income is not an isolated, little-known provision of the
Code but one of the Code's defining features. In addition, the effects of the double tax have been
extensively studied, and there is a remarkable degree of consensus that the double tax is inefficient.
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and allowing shareholders full dividend and capital gains relief. Second, if
Congress wanted to hide taxes at the corporate level, it would have little
reason to reduce this hidden-tax revenue by enacting measures like ACRS that
reduce effective corporate tax rates. Finally, this theory does not explain why
corporations do not lobby for integration.
A variant of the hidden-tax argument claims that the corporate tax is
shifted, in part or in whole, from corporate shareholders to others, such as
labor, firm customers, or capital generaly 0 According to this argument,
voters do not understand that they bear the cost of the corporate tax in the
form of reduced wages and higher prices. Because it applies generally to any
capital tax, this version of the hidden-tax explanation has the same defect as
the rational-populist argument. It cannot explain why two tiers of tax are
imposed, why Congress enacts measures like ACRS that reduce effective
corporate tax rates, or why public corporations do not lobby for integration.3
D. Some Empirical Evidence on Public Opinion
Even if correct, the entity, populist, and hidden-tax hypotheses would not
explain the current pattern of corporate taxation. The actual evidence of public
opinion casts doubt on the premise that the public supports full double
taxation. Indeed, public opinion polls present a new puzzle: They suggest that
the most politically viable method of taxing corporations should be a system
of integration, albeit a partial one.
The public unquestionably supports the imposition of a significant
corporate tax. Indeed, public opinion polls reveal that between 65% and 80%
of those polled favored increasing the corporate tax.32 Respondents showed
30. See supra note 9 (discussing tax incidence).
31. Richard Doemberg and Fred McChesney offer another explanation for tax reform that relies on
Congress's preferences. They argue that Congress supports those taxes that improve its ability to extract
campaign contributions. See Richard L. Doemberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and
Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913 (1987) [hereinafter Doemberg & McChesney,
Rate and Durability]; Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Interest-Group Organization in a Coasean
Model of Regulation, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 73 (1991). Congress, they argue, often threatens to impose
burdens in order to induce groups to bribe congresspersons to induce them to abstain from imposing the
burden. Doemberg & McChesney, Rate and Durability, supra, at 934; Richard L. Doemberg & Fred S.
MeChesney, Doing Good or Doing IVell?: Congress and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv.
891, 898-99 (1987) (book review) [hereinafter Doemberg & McChesney, Doing Good]; see McChesney,
supra; Milton Friedman, Tax Reform Lets Politicians Look for New Donors, WALL ST. J., July 7, 1986,
at 12. The desire to extract rents, however, would not cause Congress to resist integration. Many, if not
most, integration plans retain the corporate tax. Firms subject to a corporate tax still would have an
incentive to "bribe" Congress for relief.
32. See infra Appendix B, Table B.I. When asked whether corporate taxes should be raised to reduce
the deficit, this number generally rose, sometimes as high as 80%. Id. Public attitudes did seem sensitive
to the manner in which the question was framed. Fewer people opposed lowering the corporate tax than
favored raising it. Although about two-thirds supported raising corporate taxes, almost half were unsure
whether corporate taxes were too high. Public attitudes towards corporate tax cuts were not affected by the
suggestion that cuts might stimulate growth, but respondents supported cuts when the question suggested
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only somewhat more support for reducing dividend taxes than for reducing
corporate taxes.33 A corporate dividend deduction, perhaps viewed as midway
between a corporate tax cut and a shareholder-level deduction, drew 50%
opposition.
But support for corporate taxation and dividend taxation does not translate
into support for double taxation. At one time the public may have endorsed
two-tier taxation. 5 More recent polls, however, show that no more than 37%
and as little as 29% of the public supports double taxation.36 The apparent
contradiction between opposition to double taxation and support for each tax
separately probably results from a framing problem. Until pressed, respondents
interpret questions about corporate and dividend taxation as general questions
about taxing capital.
Unfortunately, the poll data do not draw an important distinction. Some
polls asked whether voters favored double taxation of dividends on which
corporate tax had been paid. No poll seems to have asked, directly or
indirectly, whether respondents favored the double taxation of retained
earnings. Public opinion data therefore do not reveal whether the public favors
true single-level taxation or favors double-level taxation of retained earnings
and single-level taxation of dividends.
This lacuna in poll data is unfortunate. A direct question about double
taxation of retained earnings would shed light on voters' concept of the
corporation. Public support for single taxation of retained earnings would
imply that the public had accepted the academic conduit theory.37 Public
support for double taxation of retained earnings, however, would be
inconsistent with any theory presented so far, including the conduit view. Such
support would seem to imply a modified version of the hidden-tax or entity
that cuts might create jobs. One-third of those who supported raising federal corporate taxes to reduce the
deficit said they would not continue to support raises if the taxes were passed on to consumers.
33. One poll question, repeated over a number of years, showed 46%--54% in favor of dividend tax
reduction and 32%-46% opposed. In 1985, 46% of respondents thought that elimination of the $100-per-
person exemption on dividend income would make the tax system more fair. Questions suggesting that cuts
in dividend taxes might stimulate investment increased support by about 10%. See infra Appendix B, Table
B.2.
34. See infra Appendix B, Table B.2.
35. One poll taken in 1949 showed 51% support for a two-tier tax. A poll taken in 1945 showed 32%
support, although many respondents were unsure of their views. See infra Appendix B, Table B.3.
36. See infra Appendix B, Table B.3. It may, however, be worth noting that in one poll, 42% of
Americans said that they understood the idea of a stock dividend well enough to explain it to someone else.
See Lieberman Research, Americans and Their Money, July 1987, available in DIALOG, Poll database
(search containing "MONEY" in SOURCE field and "07/00/87" in PD field and "DIVIDEND").
37. Unlike pure integration plans, which achieve full single-level taxation by treating the corporation
purely as a conduit for profits that are passed through to shareholders, partial integration plans reduce, but
do not eliminate entirely, the double-tax treatment of corporate profits. Because of the lingering appeal of
the entity theory, the public might object to a pure integration plan because it eliminates the corporate-level




arguments, in which the public was misled by the corporate veil only when
earnings were retained.
The possibility that voters have different views on dividends and retained
earnings has intriguing implications for the politics of the corporate tax. Voters
who subscribe to the conduit theory should support a pure integration plan.
Such a plan would treat the corporation purely as a conduit for profits passed
through to shareholders for tax purposes, as in a partnership or Subchapter S
corporation. In contrast, voters who are described by a modified hidden-tax
theory would not support pure integration, but would support certain partial
integration plans, which allow for some double taxation.
Pure integration is not administratively practical, however, and has never
been seriously considered in the United States. Instead, the integration plans
that have been proposed generally are partial integration plans. In turn, the
most popular partial integration plans, referred to as distribution-based
methods, would in fact impose a double tax on retained earnings and a single
tax on dividends. These methods are regarded as compromises under the
conduit approach but constitute the preferred system on the modified-entity and
hidden-tax theories. Thus, under either interpretation of the poll data, the
public should support this form of partial integration. The poll data thus
deepen the mystery of the persistent double tax.
E. Summary
Neither populist nor hidden-tax arguments can explain the failure of
previous efforts to integrate the tax system. In the next two parts, we will
examine the motives and behavior of corporate managers, a group ignored by
the populist and hidden-tax theories.
ITm. WHAT MANAGERS WANT IN A TAX CUT
Most wealth in corporate form is held by large, publicly traded
corporations. In these corporations, ownership is separated from control: The
firms are controlled by professional managers, while firm owners-the
shareholders-are largely passive.38 But although managers are entrusted with
38. See ADOLF BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPEmRY 7-9 (1932); Ronald Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive
Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 833-36 (1981); see also Bernard S. Black, Agents
Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 815-20 (1992)
[hereinafter Black, Agents] (discussing limits and benefits of institutional investor monitoring); Bernard S.
Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520, 523-26 (1990) [hereinafter Black,
Shareholder Passivity] (examining reasons for shareholder passivity but arguing that passivity is not
inevitable); Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence, 39
UCLA L. REv. 895, 917-27 (1992) [hereinafter Black, Value] (reviewing evidence that large outside
shareholders do valuable monitoring).
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guarding shareholder interests, their own interests do not always coincide with
those of shareholders. Where the interests of these two groups conflict,
managers will attempt to pursue their own interests, even at shareholders'
expense.
39
In this part, we argue that shareholders and managers will often have
divergent views on tax policy. The principal difference between them results
from their different views on subsidies to existing capital. Shareholders
invariably favor policies that increase the return to existing capital; they
sometimes, but not always, support policies that stimulate investment. In
contrast, managers are primarily concerned with stimulating new investment.
They have little interest in increasing the return to existing capital, though they
do not actively oppose measures that do this. Managers therefore attach a low
priority to integration, which provides a large windfall to existing capital, and
only a small stimulus to new investment. Managers prefer to lobby for other
tax measures, such as ACRS and ITCs, that may be less advantageous to
shareholders but are more cost-effective in stimulating investment.
A. Shareholders and Managers
Much of the conflict between shareholders and managers arises from the
different portfolios they hold. Most shareholders hold fully diversified
portfolios and are thus not overly dependent on any one firm. Managers, by
contrast, have most of their wealth tied to their corporate employer, largely in
the form of firm-specific human capital. These different portfolios produce
different attitudes towards the risk of firm failure.4" Because most
shareholders hold fully diversified portfolios, they are effectively risk-neutral
with respect to the risk of firm failure. Accordingly, shareholders want
managers to maximize each firm's expected profits without regard to risk.4 '
Managers, however, are heavily dependent on the fortunes of the firm they
manage and thus are risk-averse with respect to the risk of firm failure42
39. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Finn, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288
(1980); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
40. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 39, at 349-50, 352-53; Alan Marcus, Risk Sharing and the
Theory of the Firm, 13 BELL J. ECON. 369 (1982); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Ruin:
Bankruptcy and Investment Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (1991). See generally Steven Shavell, Risk
Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55 (1979) (describing
risk allocation implicit in principal-agent payment arrangements).
41. To the extent that insolvency costs are significant, shareholders will not be completely indifferent
to the risk of firm failure. Nevertheless, shareholders in firms that undergo bankruptcy reorganization often
retain some of their initial investment if the firm becomes successful after emerging from reorganization.
See Jonathan R. Macey, Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations, 71 B.U. L. REv. 315,
326 (1991). Moreover, for firms not in the shadow of insolvency, shareholders may be reasonably treated
as risk-neutral.
42. See generally RONALD W. MASULIS, THE DEBT/EQurrY CHOICE 47-60 (1988) (describing potential
conflicts of interest between stockholders and risk-averse managers); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 39,
at 306, 308-10 (same). Managers of publicly held firms that become insolvent often lose their jobs; those
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Because they are risk-averse, managers will sometimes pursue different
investments than risk-neutral shareholders would choose. First, shareholders
generally want the firm to pursue any project, however risky, that has positive
expected profits.43 Managers, by contrast, may avoid some high-risk projects,
even though these projects have positive expected profits.44 In addition,
managers may attempt to reduce the risk of firm failure by diversifying the
firm-that is, by expanding the firm into new businesses that face independent
risks. Managers may pursue such diversifying investments even when they
result in some reduction in firm value.45 This reduction in firm value comes
at the expense of shareholders, who generally derive no independent benefit
from the diversification of any one firm because they already own diversified
portfolios.46
Portfolio differences may produce another conflict between shareholders
and managers. Managers may pursue investment strategies designed not to
maximize profits but to secure their positions and increase their salaries.47
They may, for example, make their skills more valuable to the firm through
irreversible investments in their areas of expertise.48 Similarly, managers of
who retain their positions suffer significant reductions in their salary and bonuses. See Stuart C. Gilson &
Michael R. Vetsuypens, CEO Compensation in Financially Distressed Firms: An Empirical Analysis, 48
J. FIN. 425, 440-48 (1993); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share
in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 149-50
(1990); see also Rose-Ackerman, supra note 40, at 279-97 (arguing that managers fear loss of both job
and prestige if firm encounters financial difficulties). For a discussion of the vulnerability of both highly
specialized managers and those with more general managerial skills, see, e.g., William J. Carney,
Controlling Management Opportunism in the Market for Corporate Control: An Agency Cost Model, 1988
WIS. L. REv. 385, 418-20.
43. But see supra note 41.
44. See generally BERLE & MEANS, supra note 38, at 119-25; ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 700 (Modem Library ed. 1937) (1776); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 39, at 306, 308-10.
Managers' concern for their reputations may exacerbate their tendency to pursue overly safe projects. Anjan
V. Thakor, Corporate Investments and Finance, FIN. MGoIT., Summer 1993, at 135, 139-40; see David
Hirshleifer & Anjan V. Thakor, Managerial Conservatism, Project Choice, and Debt, 5 REv. FIN. STuD.
437, 437-39, 465 (1992); see also David -irshleifer, Managerial Reputation and Corporate Investment
Decisions, FIN. MGNIT., Summer 1993, at 145 (describing reasons for, and effects of, managers' decision
to build personal reputations).
45. See, e.g., Randall Morck et al., Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?, 45 J. FIN. 31,
31-32 (1990); Andrei Schleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Value Maximization and the Acquisition Process, I.
ECON. PERSP., Winter 1988, at 7, 13-15; see also Larry H. Lang & Ren6 M. Stulz, Tobin's q, Corporate
Diversification, and Firm Performance, 102 J. POL. EON. 1248 (1994) (showing that diversified firms are
poor performers relative to firms that are not diversified).
46. Indeed, shareholders of firms pursuing activities with substantial potential tort liability may prefer
to organize these activities into separate corporations in order to gain maximum benefit from limited
liability.
47. In addition, managers may want to spend more on perquisites and other benefits than shareholders
would prefer. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 39, at 306, 308-10.
48. Andrei Schleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Management Entrenchment: The Case of Manager-Specific
Investments, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 123, 123-24, 137 (1989). This may also provide managers with another
incentive to diversify the firm. Evidence suggests that managing a diversified firm requires special
managerial talent, for which firms will compensate managers handsomely. See NANCY L. ROSE & ANDREA
SHEPARD, FIRM DIVERSIFICATION AND CEO COMPENSATION: MANAGERIAL ABILITY OR EXECUTIVE
ENTRENCHMENT? 1-6, 18-33 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 4723, 1994).
Managers with this particular talent, accordingly, may have an incentive to diversify their firms in order
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firms in declining industries may attempt to preserve their positions by
expanding the firm into new businesses, even though shareholder wealth
maximization might dictate shrinkage or liquidation.
B. Tax Policy
Because their interests differ, managers and shareholders have different
views on tax policy. Congress can reduce the taxes paid by firms and their
shareholders through a number of mechanisms, including integration, reduced
corporate tax rates, and increased business tax preferences such as ACRS and
ITCs. Congress is unlikely to grant more than a few of these benefits,
however, and managers and shareholders differ on the priority that they assign
to various policies.
1. Windfalls Versus Benefits to New Investments
Shareholders and managers have divergent views on integration largely
because they differ in their taste for tax cuts that create windfalls. Virtually
any cut in capital taxes will increase the return on new investments, and thus
will stimulate investment. This stimulus always helps managers but may or
may not help shareholders. Some cuts also increase the return to assets that
firms have already purchased. These tax cuts therefore confer a windfall on
existing assets, and thereby help existing shareholders. Managers, in contrast,
have little to gain from tax cuts that produce windfalls, because windfalls do
little to stimulate new investment.
Integration, corporate rate cuts, and capital gains cuts all confer windfalls
on existing shareholders. The windfalls result from the fact that the price of
any asset reflects expected after-tax returns. Thus, at any given time, the tax
treatment of income from the asset is capitalized, or reflected in the price of
the asset. When taxes on the asset are cut, the price of the asset rises, giving
its owner a windfall.49 Integration, corporate rate cuts, and capital gains cuts
all lower the total tax burden on both old and new equity, and thus raise the
value of existing equity. Owners of existing equity benefit from the increase
in the value of their assets even if they do not increase their investment in
response to the cut. In contrast, tax incentives such as ACRS and ITCs
generally apply only to new assets. An asset already in service when ACRS
or an ITC is implemented does not, at least under prevailing rules, receive
more favorable depreciation or tax credits.
to maximize their value to the firm.
49. See generally Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARv. L. REv. 509,




A simple example illustrates the difference between tax cuts that create
windfalls and those that do not. Suppose that the economy has two sectors,
corporate and noncorporate, and one factor of production, capital.50 Capital
income from both sectors is subject to a personal-level tax. Assume that
corporate income is subject to an additional corporate-level tax at a 50% rate.
Investors demand a return of 6% before personal taxes but after entity-level
taxes. Corporations, therefore, cannot profitably pursue projects that generate
less than a pretax return of 12%. Assume that, under this initial tax policy, the
equilibrium capital stock is 100 units. A share of stock represents one dollar
of capital and produces one unit of output. The output price is 120 per unit,
so that each dollar of capital produces pretax income of 120 per year, leaving
after-tax income of 60. Assuming for simplicity that capital does not
depreciate, each share is equivalent to a perpetuity of 60. Since the required
rate of return is 6%, the net present value of this perpetuity is $1.51
Suppose that Congress would like to stimulate output and investment.
Since the demand for corporate output is inevitably downward-sloping, any
increase in output produces a drop in output price and, therefore, in the pretax
return to capital. To stimulate investment, then, Congress must cut taxes so
that corporations can earn a lower pretax rate of return and still provide
shareholders with the required 6% net marginal rate of return. 2
The effect of a tax cut on existing shareholders will depend on the type of
cut that Congress chooses. A tax break limited to new investment, such as
ACRS or an ITC, will lower the tax rate only on income from additional
investment. The marginal cost of production will therefore fall, increasing the
corporate sector's marginal supply of output to consumers. Equilibrium output
will rise to the intersection of this new output supply curve with the existing
output demand curve. The price of output will fall. The stimulus effect of this
tax cut will actually harm old shareholders. The fall in output prices will
depress the pretax return to all shares, while the tax treatment of old capital
will stay constant. The value of old shares will therefore decline. 3 Suppose,
for example, that Congress cuts taxes on marginal investments from 50% to
40%. Suppose that at the new equilibrium, the marginal unit of capital
50. Expanding the analysis to two factors would not significantly alter our conclusion that existing
shareholders generally get a windfall when taxes on corporate capital are reduced. In a two-factor world
with both capital and labor, under reasonable assumptions, capital still benefits from a fall in capital taxes,
although labor may also benefit. See supra note 9. For a more general discussion of tax incidence, see
RICHARD TRESCH, PUBLIC FINANCE: A NORMATIVE THEORY 393-409 (1981); Kotlikoff & Summers, supra
note 9.
51. The present value of any perpetuity is C/r, where C is the annual cash flow from the perpetuity
and r is the interest rate.
52. Strictly speaking, Congress must choose the tax rate that makes the marginal unit of investment
pay the required return. The sentence in the text, which assumes that the required rate of return remains
6%, implicitly assumes that the corporate sector is small or that the supply of capital is perfectly elastic.
This assumption is made for the sake of expositional simplicity. The same basic reasoning applies if the
tax change does have some effect on the interest rate.
53. See Kotlikoff & Summers, supra note 9, at 1085-86.
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produces only 0.91 units of output,' 4 and the equilibrium output price falls to
110. The pretax return to a unit of new capital would therefore be 0.91(110)
= 100. The after-tax return to new capital would be the required 60. Old
capital will still produce one unit of output, but marginal pretax revenue per
share will fall from 120 to 110. After the 50% corporate tax, the return to old
capital will be 5.5¢.55 This in turn will lower share value to 920.
Although an increase in ITCs or ACRS helps only new capital, a rate cut
or integration plan will lower the burden on all capital. This reduction in tax
rates will confer a windfall on existing equity, although the windfall will be
partially offset by the drop in output prices. Using the numbers from the
previous example, a general rate cut to 40% will again cause supply to rise so
that equilibrium output price will fall to 110; the pretax return to a unit of new
capital will again be 100; and the after-tax return to new capital will still be
the required 60. Old capital will again have a marginal physical product of 1
and marginal pretax revenue per share will fall from 120 to 110. With the new
40% corporate tax, the after-tax revenue per share of old capital will be 110(1
- 0.4) = 6.60. Share value will therefore rise from $1 to $1.10 (6.60 represents
a 6% return on $1.10).56
Tax cuts that produce windfalls are inefficient tools for stimulating
investment. 7 Windfalls themselves are merely transfers that produce no
increase in investment. The revenue loss in a windfall, however, reduces
welfare. Congress would either have to reduce spending or make up the lost
revenue from other sources, such as a tax on wages. This new tax would create
a new deadweight loss of its own by, for example, decreasing the supply of
labor.
Because shareholders and managers have different attitudes towards
windfalls and investment stimulus, they have different views on tax policy.
54. The example in text assumes, as is probably the case, that the corporate sector has an upward-
sloping supply curve. An upward-sloping supply curve could result from either decreasing returns to scale
or a resource constraint. In practice, the assumption of no resource constraints is highly implausible for a
large segment of the economy such as the corporate sector.
55. For expositional simplicity, the discussion in text implicitly assumes that the marginal physical
product of capital is I for all units of old capital, and begins to decline only with new capital. In practice,
however, if marginal physical product declines at any point, it probably declines at all levels. Thus, old
capital other than the last unit probably has a marginal product above I. Inframarginal units of capital,
therefore, earn supernormal returns. These returns will be distributed pro rata among shareholders, so that
initial share price will be above $1 and final share price will be above 920. The effect of the tax cut,
though, will be as described in text.
56. As noted earlier, a flat coporate supply curve implausibly assumes no resource constraints. See
supra note 54. If, however, the corporate sector has a flat supply curve, the resulting drop in output price
will entirely eliminate the windfall to old capital. The new output price will equal the old price minus the
tax cut, and after-tax revenue from old shares will be unaffected by the cut. In the example, pretax revenue
per share would drop from 120 to 100. Since the tax cut would apply to revenue from old shares, the
annual revenue per share after the 40% corporate tax would be 60. Share value would therefore remain at
$1.
57. See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
439 (3d ed. 1980) (noting that, since profitability of new investment is what matters for incentive purposes,
rate reduction is less effective than accelerated depreciation or investment tax credit in producing stimulus).
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Shareholders, by definition, own portfolios of existing equity. They therefore
gain from policies, such as integration, that provide windfalls to existing
equity. While shareholders would like to stimulate new investment, they would
prefer not to do so through policies that harm existing equity. Existing
shareholders thus generally should prefer integration to tax subsidies for new
capital because the tax subsidies decrease the value of existing equity.58
Most managers, in contrast, have much to gain from incentives for new
investment, and little to gain from windfalls to existing equity. Most managers
thus support stimulus measures, such as integration, that provide subsidies to
both new and old capital, but generally prefer incentives, such as ACRS and
ITCs, that subsidize only new capital. 59 Tax subsidies for new investment
help managers to expand their firms by increasing the after-tax profitability of
new investments, thus enabling managers to pursue otherwise unprofitable
projects. Managers will therefore lobby for these preferences even if
shareholders would prefer integration.
Indeed, to protect existing tax preferences for new capital, some managers
may actively oppose integration. The windfall profits from integration would
reduce tax revenues. Managers might reasonably fear that the tax revenues lost
as a result of integration would be financed by reducing other corporate tax
preferences, or by raising the tax rate on the richest individuals.0
2. Targeted Tax Cuts
For some managers, ACRS and ITCs have another advantage over
integration. Corporate managers prefer to lobby on behalf of provisions that
help only their firms or industries. 1 Integration affects all firms, while ACRS
and ITCs can be targeted to specific industries. Managers of firms that benefit
from ACRS and ITCs are therefore likely to focus their efforts on obtaining
these targeted benefits, rather than on integration. 2
Shareholders, however, do not share managers' preference for targeted tax
cuts. They hold diversified portfolios and therefore enjoy the full benefits of
across-the-board as well as targeted cuts. Shareholders thus should be less
58. See supra text accompanying note 53.
59. See generally RONALD F. KING, MONEY, TIME, & POLMCS: INVESTMENT TAX SUBSIDIES &
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 285-86, 291,383, 390, 392 (1993) (documenting consistent business lobbying for
tax policies that directly stimulate new investment, such as increased depreciation allowances).
Nevertheless, a few managers may prefer integration. See infra Subsection Im.B.3.
60. Other managers also might oppose integration even if it were financed from general revenues. See
infra Part IV.
61. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACnON: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS 147-48 (1965) (arguing that business lobbying is more effective at industry level than at level of
entire business community).
62. Certain managers may have an additional reason to prefer ACRS to integration. ACRS favors
investments in physical assets, which in turn may promote managerial entrenchment. See generally Schleifer
& Visny, supra note 48.
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enthusiastic about tax cuts targeted to a single industry. To receive the
maximum benefit of targeted cuts, shareholders would have to invest a
disproportionate share of their assets in the targeted industry. Such an
investment strategy would reduce the diversification of the shareholder's
portfolio and therefore increase the overall portfolio risk.
3. A Few Managers Prefer Integration
A few managers may nonetheless actively support integration. Some
businesses, by their nature, cannot benefit from tax provisions such as ACRS
and ITCs. These include firms, such as high technology companies, that have
relatively little physical capital.63 Like other managers, managers of these
firms will advocate preferences, such as tax subsidies for research and
development, that benefit new investments that their firms might make.
Because such preferences are often not available, managers should support
integration and lower rates as the only avenues through which their tax burden
can be reduced.64
C. The Legislative Record
1. Integration Versus ACRS and ITCs
The history of tax reform is consistent with our analysis of what policies
managers should prefer. Managers have testified in favor of integration, but
they have generally reserved their active lobbying efforts for tax preferences
for new investments, such as ACRS and ITCs.
Contrary to what many observers believe,65 the history of integration
efforts shows that many managers have consistently favored integration. A
large group of managers has endorsed every legislative initiative to reduce
double taxation. The Treasury Department first considered integration seriously
in the late 1960s.66 Legislative integration proposals were made in 1975 by
63. See Michael S. Knoll, Taxing Prometheus: How the Corporate Interest Deduction Discourages
Innovation and Risk-Taking, 38 VILL. L. REV. 1461, 1496 (1994) (noting that high-technology companies
tend to rely heavily on intangible capital).
64. Cf. WnIr, supra note 19, at 225 (describing lobbying for safe-harbor leasing rule by businesses
that cannot use ACRS credits because they lack taxable income).
65. See, e.g., Lorence L. Bravenec, A Non Traditional Approach to Corporate Integration, 42 TAX
NOT s 1381, 1381 (1989) (claiming that managers favor partial integration plans in which corporate
taxation would be continued); Robert J. Leonard, A Pragmatic View of Corporate Integration, 35 TAX
NOTES 889, 895 (1987) (describing lack of enthusiasm in business community for integration); Lee A.
Sheppard, The Obstacles to Corporate Tax Integration, 47 TAX NOTES 1168, 1168 (1990) (noting that
business owners prefer tax reduction in form other than integration); Laura Saunders, How the Government
Subsidizes Leveraged Takeovers, FORBES, Nov. 28, 1988, at 192, 192 (noting that business community
sandbagged integration efforts during Carter and Reagan administrations).
66. Interest in integration was stimulated by the report of the Canadian Government's Carter
Commission in 1966. See REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION (1966).
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Treasury Secretary William Simon,67  in 1978 by Representative Al
Ullman, 68 and in 1986 by the Reagan Treasury Department. The first three
measures were considered in congressional hearings. Every manager who
testified endorsed integration.69 Similarly, the 1986 integration proposals
prompted numerous letters of support from business leaders." A group of
twenty chief executive officers (CEOs) of major companies wrote a letter to
,Treasury Secretary Baker for the sole purpose of supporting integration.7
Other CEOs wrote individual letters supporting integration and tax cuts.
72
67. See Ways and Means Hearings, supra note 19, at 3857-58 (testimony of William Simon, Secretary
of Treasury). The proposal was discussed in Finance Hearings, supra note 19, at 70-77. The proposed plan
would have combined shareholder-credit and dividend-deduction methods, with no reinvestment feature.
68. 124 CONG. REC. 2132-34 (1978); 124 CONG. REC. 7978-80 (1978). This proposal would have
provided imputation credit treatment for 10% of dividends. Id.
69. Finance Hearings, supra note 19, at 139-40 (statement of Walker Winter, Chamber of Commerce
of United States); id. at 266, 271-72 (statement of Roland M. Bixler, National Association of
Manufacturers); id. at 389, 391 (statement of George S. Koch, Chairman, Federal Finance Committee,
Council of State Chambers of Commerce); id. at 993, 1011-15 (statement of Dennis P. Bedell, Chairman,
American Mining Companies Tax Committee); id. at 1239, 1252 (statement of John T. Higgins, Vice
President, Burlington Industries, on behalf of American Textile Manufacturers Institute); id. at 1257, 1271
(statement of Charles W. Stewart, President, Machinery and Allied Products Institute); id. at 1291, 1301-02
(statement of Malcolm R. Lovell, Jr., President, Rubber Manufacturers Association); id. at 1335, 1344
(statement of Norma Pace, Senior Vice President, American Paper Institute); see also infra Appendix A.
70. The 1986 integration proposals were not accompanied by hearings.
71. CEO Tax Group Backs Dividends-Paid Deduction, TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 22, 1986, at 51. The
signatories were the Chairpersons or CEOs of Allied-Signal Inc., American Can Co., Beneficial Corp., Dart
& Kraft, Inc., Dayton Hudson Corp., Emerson Electric Co., Federated Department Stores, Inc., General
Foods, General Motors, Hallmark Cards, Inc., Hewlett-Packard, IBM, J.C. Penney Co., Levi Strauss & Co.,
3M, Merck & Co., Procter & Gamble, PepsiCo, Pillsbury, and Sara Lee Corp.
72. See, e.g., Corporate America Comments on Treasury l's Impact on Corporations, TAX NOTES
TODAY, June 5, 1985, at 190 (Hamish Maxwell, Chairperson, Philip Morris, supporting integration);
Statement by Edmund B. Fitzgerald, Chairperson, President, and CEO, Northern Telecom, in TAX NOTES
Microfiche, Doc. 85-2291 (urging phased-in tax cuts and partial dividend deductibility); Statement by Jack
F. Bennett, Director and Senior Vice President, Exxon, id. Doc. 85-2659 (letter to editor of New York
imes criticizing double taxation); Statement by Stanley C. Pace, Chairperson and President, TRW, Inc.,
& Alexander B. Trowbridge, President, National Association of Manufacturers, id. Doc. 85-2719
(supporting tax cuts and partial dividend deductibility); Statement by William W. Berry, President and
CEO, Dominion Resources, id. Doc. 85-2722 (same); Statement by Charles F Zodrow, Roadway Services,
Inc., id. Doc. 85-2723 (same); Statement by Robert 0. Aders, President and CEO, Food Marketing
Institute, id. Doc. 85-2725 (same); Statement by J. Tylee Wilson, Chairperson and CEO, RJ. Reynolds
Industries, id. Doc. 85-3244 (calling double taxation "a grossly unfair practice which stifles investment and
growth"); Statement by James L. Eichner, Chairperson, Rochester Tax Council and Director of Corporate
Tax, Eastman Kodak, id. Doc. 85-3889 (Pub.) (Council composed of Bausch & Lomb, Inc., Champion
Products, Gannett Co., Gleason Corp., Eastman Kodak, R.T. French Co., Schlegel Corp., Security NY State
Corp., Sybron Corp., and Xerox, supporting partial deduction for dividends paid and lower tax rates);
Statement by William Stiritz, Chairperson and CEO, Ralston Purina, id. Doc. 85-3890; Statement by Paul
A. Miller, Chairperson, Pacific Lighting Corp., id. Doc. 85-3891 (supporting dividend deductibility in
concept); Statement by Boyd F. Schenk, President and CEO, IC Industries, id. Doc. 85-3892 (supporting
partial dividend deduction); Statement by Neil A. Fortkamp, General Manager, Corporate Tax, Intemorth,
Inc., id. Doc. 85-4088 (supporting integration); Statement by G.K.G. Stevens, Chairperson, Unilever United
States, Inc., id. Doc. 85-4089 (supporting partial deduction for dividends); Statement by William R.
Howell, Chairperson and CEO, J.C. Penney Co., id. Doc. 85-4092 (supporting a reduction in corporate tax
rate and partial deduction for dividends); Statement by Jack A. MacAllister, President and CEO, US West,
Inc., id. Doc. 85-4714 (describing importance of "capital formation incentives").
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Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, business support was reiterated in many less
formal settings. 3
Although managers have supported integration, they have consistently
preferred other measures that would reduce corporate sector taxes.74 A 1983
survey of 160 Fortune 1000 executives showed 94.5% in favor of ITCs, 87.6%
supporting ACRS, and only 70% in favor of integration.' As one corporate
representative said, "We're supportive of the administration's interests, but...
[ending double taxation] is very, very expensive .... For the same amount of
money, there are more powerful ways to reduce the cost of capital... like the
investment tax credit."76
Managers' preference for tax reductions for new investments has been
reflected in their lobbying efforts. Major lobbying groups have regularly
focused their attention on ACRS and other measures designed to stimulate new
investment.77 The Carter administration decided against introducing an
integration proposal,78 in part because the business community showed little
73. For example, Mary Kay Ash, President of Mary Kay Cosmetics, said that the elimination of the
double tax should be the first priority of tax reformers. Lee A. Sheppard, Corporate Tax Integration, the
Proper Way to Eliminate the Corporate Tax, 27 TAX NOTES 637, 637 (1985). The American Business
Conference, which represents midsized growth companies, also advocated integration. Mario P. Borini, The
Irrational Partner, INC., Nov. 1984, at 21 (citing support for total elimination of corporate income tax by
many, including Conference President Jack Albertine).
74. In the words of Professor Michael Graetz, managers oppose integration because they
always ha[ve] a better way to spend the revenue. The better way is on money they have control
over. They wanta reduction in tax on capital retained by the corporation. They would be happy
with something like an investment credit or rapid depreciation. If you will not give them that,
they would like a reduction in the corporate rate on retained earnings. But their favorite is not
a reduction in the corporate rate that applies only to distributed earnings. It never will be.
SECTION OF TAXATION, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N & TAX SECTION, Ntw YORK STATE BAR ASS'N,
CORPORATE TAX REFORM 161 (1988) [hereinafter CORPORATE TAX REFORM] (comments of Professor
Michael Graetz). However, although managerial preference for ACRS has been noted by previous
observers, the explanation generally offered has been managerial desire to trap earnings.
75. Tax System Survey, PR Newswire, May 31, 1983, available in DIALOG. A 1993 survey of
midsized manufacturers showed the ITC to be the most popular tax reform, with 92% indicating that its
restoration would be beneficial. Midsized Manufacturers Rate ITC Top Tax Benefit, J. Acer., Aug. 1993,
at 30. Eighty-three percent gave such a rating to a reduction in the capital gains tax rate. A 1993 study of
corporate executives showed ITCs and ACRS as the preferred tax incentives. Ernst & Young, Taxation and
Corporate Growth, 59 TAX NOTES 131, 132-33 (1993). As this study noted:
Support for these tax incentives varied by industry group. Retailers are the leading supporters
of shorter depreciable lives for new assets and financial service executives are strong supporters
of capital gains tax cuts. Levels of support also varied by size of the firms: executives with
smaller firms supported the idea of capital gains tax cuts in greater percentages than did
executives from large- or middle-market companies.
Id. at 133. The Manufacturers' Alliance for Productivity & Innovation (MAPI) reported that "[t]he vast
majority of... [its members] are more concerned with tax measures such as investment tax credits,
depreciation acceleration, and the research credit than with a capital gains rate cut." Correction:
Manufacturers' Alliance for Productivity and Innovation, 47 TAX NOTES 763, 763 (1990).
76. Jayne Levin, Treasury Has Three Choices for Ending Double Taxation; And There's Something
Wrong with Each, INV. DEALERS' DIG., May 21, 1990, at 49 (quoting Margo Thoming, chief economist
of American Council for Capital Formation).
77. See, e.g., WrrrE, supra note 19, at 224-25; Edward Cowan, The Quiet Campaign to Cut Capital
Gains Taxes-to Zero, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1981, § 3, at 8.
78. WrrTE, supra note 19, at 205; see also Tax Reform Option Papers, supra note 19, at 48-53
(outlining proposals of Treasury Department and of Council of Economic Advisors).
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interest in integration,79 while actively lobbying for ACRS, ITCs, and other
subsidies for new capital.8" During the 1978 Ullman hearings, those who
expressed concerns about integration condemned the effects of double taxation,
but expressed the hope that integration would not diminish other capital
incentives.81  Businesses that did not press for ACRS lobbied not for
integration, but for other tax measures of special benefit to their firms, such
as depletion allowances and provisions governing the deductions for foreign
tax payments.
During the 1986 tax reform, the first set of proposals for reform, known
as Treasury I, advocated phased-in full integration and rate cuts in return for
dramatic reductions in ACRS and 1TCs.82 Most business groups endorsed
integration while objecting to reductions in ACRS and ITCs.83 A few
endorsed rate cuts and the repeal of ITCs and ACRS.' 4 This group consisted
79. See James M. Poterba & Lawrence H. Summers, The Economic Effects of Dividend Taxation, in
RECENT ADVANCES IN CORPORATE RNANCE 227, 275 (Edward I. Altman & Marti G. Subrahmanyam eds.,
1985); Francis X. Clines, Corporate Tax Upsets Reagan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1983, at Dl.
80. See generally WrITrE, supra note 19, at 204-19 (providing detailed political history of Carter-era
tax reform).
81. See The President's 1978 Tax Reduction and Reform Proposals: Hearings Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6111, 6114 (1978) [hereinafter House Hearings]
(testimony and statement of Henry L. Duncombe, Jr., Vice President and Chief Economist, GM); id. at
6260 (statement of American Bankers Association); see also infra Appendix A (showing such sentiments
at 1975 and 1978 hearings).
82. TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, supra note 18, at 136-37. The proposal would have begun with a
deduction for one-half of dividends and then gradually increased the deductible percentage. Id. The proposal
had no reinvestment feature, and therefore would have pressured firms to distribute dividends. See id.
83. See Jeffrey H. Bimbaum, Business Groups, Tax Overhaul Support Wanes, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15,
1985, at 3; U.S. Chamber of Commerce Opposes Some Provisions of Treasury Proposal, TAX NOTES
TODAY, May 21, 1985, at 82; TAX NOTES Microfiche, Doc. 85-2291 (Letter from Edmund B. Fitzgerald,
Chairman of the Board, Northern Telecom, Inc., to Ronald A. Pearlman, Ass't Secretary for Tax Policy
(Mar. 5, 1985)); id. Doc. 85-2719 (Letter from Stanley C. Pace, Chairman of the Board, President and
Chief Executive Officer, TRW, Inc. & Alexander Trowbridge, President, National Association of
Manufacturers, to James A. Baker, Secretary of the Treasury (Apr. 22, 1985)); id. Doc. 85-2723 (Letter
from Charles F. Zodrow, Chairman of the Board, Roadway Services, Inc., to Ronald A. Pearlman, Ass't
Secretary for Tax Policy (Mar. 18, 1985)); id. Doc. 85-3889 (Letter from James L. Eichner, Chairman,
Rochester Tax Council and Director of Corporate Tax, Eastman Kodak Co., to James A. Baker, Secretary
of the Treasury (Apr. 22, 1985)); id. Doc. 85-3892 (Letter from Boyd F. Schenk, President and Chief
Operating Officer, IC Industries, to James A. Baker, Secretary of the Treasury (Apr. 9, 1985)); id. Doc.
85-4092 (Letter from William R. Howell, J.C. Penney Co., to Richard Darman, Deputy Secretary of the
Treasury (Apr. 22, 1985)).
84. See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. Supports Dividends Deduction, TAX NOTES TODAY, May 21, 1985,
at 75; Emerson Electric Supports Administration Reform Proposals, TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 6, 1985, at
89 (Letter from Charles F. Knight, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Emerson Electric Co., to James
A. Baker, Secretary of the Treasury (July 2, 1985)) (rejecting idea that traditional manufacturers would be
hurt by proposed tax reforms); IBM Says to Lower Tax Rates and Not to Distinguish Among Sources or
Uses of Income, TAX NOTES TODAY, May 29, 1985, at 74; PepsiCo Favors Tax Reform in Letter to
Rostenkowski, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 22, 1985, at 76 (Letter from David L. Wright to James A. Baker,
Secretary of the Treasury, and attached letter from J.H. Ditkoff to Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman, Committee
on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives (Oct. 4, 1985)); PepsiCo Opposes ACRS Recapture,
Supports Other Reforms. TAX NOTES TODAY, July 30, 1985, at 113 (Letter from J.H. Ditkoff to James A.
Baker, Secretary of the Treasury (July 16, 1985) and attached position paper supporting lower corporate
tax rate and other tax reform proposals); TAX NOTES Microfiche, Doc. 85-2722 (Letter from William W.
Berry, President and Chief Executive Officer, Dominion Resources, to James A. Baker, Secretary of the
Treasury (Mar. 5, 1985)); id. Doc. 85-3890 (Letter from William P. Stiritz, Chairman and Chief Executive
The Yale Law Journal
primarily of managers of firms that had little to gain from ACRS, for example
firms that are not physical-capital-intensive, such as IBM and Proctor &
Gamble.85
2. Closely Held Firms
In closely held firms, control and ownership are linked. The managers of
these firms therefore have the same tax policy objectives as shareholders.
If agency costs explain the persistence of double taxation, closely held
corporations should be able to reduce or avoid double taxation of their income.
In fact, a closely held firm can lower the double tax in a variety of ways.
Shareholders of closely held corporations are often also employees of the firm.
The firm thus can organize as a Subchapter C corporation and still largely
avoid the double tax by paying these shareholder/employees substantial
salaries. These payments are taxable to the recipient, but deductible to the
corporation as an ordinary and necessary business expense. Thus, only a single
level of tax is paid.
Closely held firms also can choose an organizational form that is not
subject to two-tier taxation. The firm can organize as a partnership or as a
nonpublicly traded limited partnership, both of which are subject to a single-
level tax. Alternatively, it can organize as a Subchapter S corporation, which
retains the benefits of the corporate form but is taxed like a partnership. 6
Indeed, over the past few decades, a striking pattern has emerged.
Congress has steadily expanded the scope of Subchapter S, while retaining the
restrictions that limit its applicability to closely held corporations. 87 In
contrast, in 1986 Congress reclassified publicly traded partnerships as
corporations for tax purposes. Firms in which ownership is separated from
control thus generally bear the double tax, regardless of whether they are
organized as corporations. Yet closely held firms, including closely held
corporations, can generally avoid the double tax.8
Officer, Ralston Purina Co., to James A. Baker, Secretary of the Treasury (Apr. 16, 1985)).
85. See Jeffrey H. Bimbaum, Growing Divisions in Business, Congress Suggest Tax Bill Faces Fight
in House, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 1985, at 52. Allied Signal and General Motors also supported the bill. Id.
Pacific Lighting Corporation, by contrast, endorsed corporate rate cuts but opposed the repeal of ACRS and
ITC. See TAX NOTES Microfiche, Doc. 85-3891 (Letter from Paul A. Miller, Chairman of the Board,
Pacific Lighting Corp., to James A. Baker, Secretary of the Treasury (Apr. 23, 1985) and attached position
paper).
86. For tax purposes, Subchapter S corporations pass income and losses through to shareholders each
year, regardless of whether they actually distribute earnings. This pass-through tax replaces the double tax
with a single-level shareholder tax.
87. Not every closely held firm is owner managed. Some are controlled by professional managers. In
this situation, many of the agency costs discussed previously will affect managers' views of investment and
tax policy. Nevertheless, the owners will exert more control over the firm and may either be able to dictate
firm lobbying policy directly or engage in lobbying themselves. See Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The
Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155, 1158-60 (1985)
(arguing that when control is concentrated shareholders are better able to monitor managers).
88. Rudnick, supra note 15, at 971-73.
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Recent changes in state incorporation statutes also provide evidence that
managers of closely held firms support integration. Many states are developing
novel forms of business organizations, such as the limited liability company,
that are designed to permit small businesses to benefit from limited liability
while still retaining the single-level tax. 9 These novel business forms are
intended to confer pass-through taxation on closely held firms. Consistent with
the general evolution of double taxation, however, a limited liability company
that effectively separates ownership and control may find itself subject to the
double tax.90
The so-called corporate tax is therefore paid by virtually all publicly held
entities, even those that are not corporations, and is not paid by closely held
entities, even those organized as corporations. This evolution suggests that
owner-managers have successfully pressed for a single-level tax, while public
managers have not.9'
D. Summary
Most integration plans would subsidize old capital. Most managers do not
oppose this, but, because their interests differ from those of shareholders, they
place a lower priority on integration than on ACRS, ITCs, and other tax
preferences for new investments. To the extent managers seek to influence tax
reform, they serve their own interests, not those of shareholders: They expend
their energy in favor of tax preferences for new capital, not integration. Indeed,
some managers may even oppose integration because they fear that it may
come at the expense of reduced tax preferences.
The windfall effects of integration do not, without more, show that
managers have influenced corporate tax policy. Rational policymakers who
want to stimulate investment might favor tax cuts limited to new investments,
since these are less costly to implement. Congress, however, does not avoid all
windfall tax measures. Rational congressional concern for windfalls cannot
explain why capital gains cuts have been common and corporate rate cuts not
unheard of while proposals to integrate the tax system have found little
support. Indeed, because capital gains cuts apply to a broad range of assets,
they create even more significant windfalls than integration would.
89. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 102-04 (5th ed. 1993); 1 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE,
RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES §§ 1.02-1.06 (1995).
90. See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 89, at 103-04 (noting tax risks of delegation of management in
limited liability company).
91. The divergent views of publicly and closely held companies may also be evidenced by the
response of the tax bar to the recent integration debate. The bar has minimized the importance of
integration for publicly held corporations while insisting on the need for expanded integration for closely
held entities. See J. Andrew Hoemer, Integration Through the Back Door: Expanded Passthroughs Gain
Support, 54 TAX NOTES 930, 930-31 (1992).
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By contrast, pressure from managers can explain why certain windfall tax
cuts, such as corporate rate and capital gains cuts, are enacted, while
integration plans are essentially ignored. Managers are not only concerned with
preserving tax subsidies to new investments; many also are concerned with
their ability to retain earnings. Even if tax preferences for new investment were
left intact, integration would reduce some managers' access to retained
earnings, thereby reducing their ability to pursue new investments. The next
part will discuss how this effect should cause some managers to actively
oppose integration and to prefer measures that increase access to retained
earnings, such as corporate rate and capital gains tax cuts.
IV. THE RETAINED EARNINGS TRAP
Most managers support integration but have not lobbied on behalf of it. A
small group of managers, however, has actively opposed integration, including
proposals that would not reduce incentives to new capital. In this part, we will
examine the reason for their opposition.
Managers of publicly held firms often want to pursue suboptimal
investment policies.9" They cannot make suboptimal investments, however,
if shareholders can monitor effectively the firm's investment policy. Retained
earnings are accompanied by less monitoring than other forms of finance, and
managers consequently prefer them to other sources of capital. Shareholders,
in turn, dislike retained earnings financing precisely because it insulates
managers from scrutiny.93
The double tax raises the cost to shareholders of dividend distributions,
thus increasing shareholders' taste for retained earnings. Some managers
therefore may prefer a double tax even to integration coupled with comparable
incentives for new investment.94 This group of managers, however, is likely
92. See supra Section III.A.
93. The conclusion that dividend policy does affect the value of the firm is consistent with most of
the modem theoretical and empirical literature but stands in direct contrast with the Modigliani and Miller
Irrelevance Theorem. See Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth, and the
Valuation of Shares, 34 J. BUS. 411 (1961). Modigliani and Miller assumed that the firm's investment
strategy was fixed. See id. at 412. Our argument follows more recent analyses in assuming that capital
structure affects investment strategy because different forms of financing produce different levels of
monitoring.
94. No previous author seems to have argued, as we did in Part III, that corporate managers are
uninterested in integration because it would create a windfall. Many tax reformers, however, have
suggested, without exploring in detail, the possibility that integration attempts have been frustrated by
managerial desire to preserve the retained earnings trap. See, e.g., Bravenec, supra note 65, at 1361 (noting
corporate managers' disfavor of full integration and support for various forms of partial integration);
Comprehensive Analysis of Integration to Precede Any Legislation, Official Says, Daily Rep. for Executives
(BNA) No. 13, at G-5 (Jan. 19, 1990) [hereinafter Comprehensive Analysis] (quoting Assistant Secretary
for Tax Policy Kenneth Gideon); Leonard, supra note 65, at 895 (noting corporate manager disapproval
of previous partial integration proposals); Saunders, supra note 65, at 192 (quoting Donald Lubick as saying
that managers oppose integration because they want "to keep their fingers on the money"). We are, to our
knowledge, the first to fully analyze this possibility.
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to be quite small.95 As a result, an integration plan that eliminated the
retained earnings trap but avoided the windfall problem might be politically
feasible.
A. Capital Structure
The investment objectives of managers of publicly held firms differ from
those of shareholders. Shareholders accordingly attempt to monitor the
managers' investment decisions to prevent investments that do not maximize
shareholder profits. Managers, in turn, often seek to avoid this monitoring.
The monitoring to which firms are subject depends in large part on how
the firm's capital needs are financed. Firms can obtain capital to finance new
investments from three sources: retained earnings, new equity, or debt.
Managers generally are subject to less monitoring when they employ retained
earnings financing than when they use external financing from debt or new
equity.
96
External financing facilitates monitoring through several mechanisms. To
obtain external financing, managers must disclose substantial amounts of
information and subject the firm's operations to the scrutiny of the capital
markets.9 7 Managers will have trouble obtaining external financing for a
95. See infra Section IV.C.
96. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. REv. 650,
653-54 (1984); Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers,
76 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROc.) 323 (1986); see also Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart,
Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives, in THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND
UNCERTAINTY 107 (John J. McCall ed., 1982) (presenting theory of debt as management's bonding or
precommitment device). See generally RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 325 (4th ed. 1991) ("If [managers] want a quiet life, they will avoid going to the
capital market for new cash and they will retain sufficient earnings to give them some financial slack.").
The claim that shareholders prefer external financing to internal financing because of the increased
monitoring (with managers preferring internal financing for this reason) is known as the "free cash flow"
theory. William 0. Christie and Vikram Nanda have found empirical support for the free cash flow theory.
See William G. Christie & Vikram Nanda, Free Cash Flow, Shareholder Value, and the Undistributed
Profits Tax of 1936 and 1937, 44 J. FIN. 1727 (1994). In addition, the evidence suggests that managers of
firms characterized by separation of ownership and control appear to prefer to retain earnings to meet the
firms' financial needs, including the financing of expansion. See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 89, at 358
(citing Stewart C. Myers, The Capital Structure Puzzle, 39 J. FIN. 575 (1984)). Firms that do not issue new
equity exhibit a lower rate of return on reinvested earnings. lit at 359; see MERRrIT B. Fox, FINANCE AND
INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN A DYNAMIC ECONOMY 234-35 (1987) (citing William J. Baumol et al.,
Earnings Retention, New Capital, and the Growth of the Firm, 52 REV. ECON. & STAT. 345,345-55 (1970)
and WJ. Baumol et al., Efficiency of Corporate Investment: Reply, 55 REv. ECON. & STAT. 128, 128-31
(1973)).
97. Although many large firms can issue securities employing Form S-3-which permits them to
employ a registration statement that in large part simply incorporates by reference filings made under the
1934 Securities Exchange Act-the process of issuing securities still may bring additional information to
the market. See Form S-3, 17 C.F.R. § 239.13(b)(2) (1985), reprinted in 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 7152.
First, a Form S-3 offering will require the services of an underwriter, who is required to perform due
diligence to determine the veracity of the statements made in the registration statement. Similarly, in the
case of debt, rating agencies will examine the firm. Finally, a firm seeking to avoid the costs of a registered
offering may find itself subject to particularly intense scrutiny because the market for unregistered offerings
is dominated by large financial institutions, who are particularly able to scrutinize firms' finances. See
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suboptimal project. Equity investors will not knowingly volunteer capital for
projects that generate a below-market rate of return; creditors, in turn, will
insist on charging a higher interest rate than they would charge if the firm
were pursuing an optimal project, since a suboptimal project will increase the
firm's risk of default.
In many respects, then, external financing shifts the final decision to
pursue an investment from managers to outsiders. To preserve their
decisionmaking power, managers can finance projects with retained earnings.
Shareholders cannot easily monitor managers' use of these earnings.98 Even
if shareholders learn of a suboptimal project, they have, under the Business
Judgment Rule,99 almost no right to prevent managers from pursuing it.
Accordingly, managers who wish to pursue suboptimal investment policies will
strongly prefer to finance growth through retained earnings. Shareholders, in
turn, will want managers to distribute earnings and to finance new projects
with newly issued equity or debt securities."00
Managers' preference for retained earnings financing often will be
reinforced by managerial compensation schemes. An executive stock option
plan will generally induce managers to reduce corporate dividends because
payment of a dividend decreases the per-share price and thus decreases the
value of the unexercised stock option." 1 In this respect, executive stock
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(1)-(2) (1994); 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.144-144A, 230.501-508 (1995);
see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
46 (1991) (noting that banks and other financial institutions may be particularly good monitors of major
corporate decisions); Barry E. Adler, An Equity-Agency Solution to the Bankruptcy-Priority Puzzle, 22 J.
LEGAL STUD. 73 (1993) (arguing that creditors serve valuable monitoring function in determining whether
to issue debt); Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE
L.J. 49, 56 (1982) (finding banks to be excellent monitors because of their experience, sophistication, and
access to debtor assets and records); cf. Black, Value, supra note 38, at 927-31 (discussing empirical
evidence from Germany and Japan suggesting that large equity holdings by banks and other financial
institutions correlate with improved profitability).
98. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 38, at 7-9; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 39, at 312-30; see
also Black, Agents, supra note 38, at 834-39 (discussing limits of insftutional-investor monitoring); Black,
Shareholder Passivity, supra note 38, 523-26 (examining reasons for shareholder passivity); Black, alue,
supra note 38, at 917-27 (discussing empirical evidence of benefits of institutional-investor monitoring).
99. Under the Business Judgement Rule, courts generally will not review the substantive merits of
managers' decisions, particularly investment decisions, unless the shareholder can prove that the managers
had a conflict of interest or failed to exercise due care in the process of making the decision (i.e., failed
to obtain sufficient information). In practice, absent self-dealing, poor investment decisions thus generally
cannot be challenged. See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 89, at 150-54.
100. Easterbrook, supra note 96, at 653-54; Jensen, supra note 96.
101. See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 89, at 288, 377. This problem arises because executive stock
option plans generally are not dividend protected. Richard A. Lambert et al., Executive Stock Option Plans
and Corporate Dividend Policy, 24 J. FIN. & QUAN. ANAL. 409, 412-14 (1989). The empirical evidence
generally confirms this relationship between stock options and dividends. See Jennifer J. Gaver & Kenneth
M. Gaver, Additional Evidence on the Association Between the Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate
Financing, Dividend, and Compensation Policies, 16 J. ACCT. & ECON. 125, 137-56 (1993); Lambert et
al., supra, at 418-23; Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Ross L. Watts, The Investment Opportunity Set and
Corporate Financing, Dividend, and Compensation Policies, 32 J. FIN. ECON. 263, 270, 287 (1992). But
see Richard A. DeFusco et al., The Association Between Executive Stock Option Plan Changes and
Managerial Decision Making, 20 FIN. MGMT. 36 (1991) (finding that dividend payout ratio increases after
stock option plans are announced). For a detailed discussion of the tax treatment of stock option plans, see
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option plans may increase the conflict between stockholders and managers over
the source of financing.
This is not to say that shareholders invariably prefer external financing to
retained earnings financing, nor that managers invariably avoid external
financing. For example, shareholders may prefer internal financing if internal
financing is less costly than external financing because of transaction costs or
asymmetric information.1 2 Managers, in turn, may sometimes want
additional monitoring as a way of bonding themselves to shareholders."0 3
Nevertheless, managers will usually want less monitoring than shareholders
and therefore will have a greater taste than shareholders for retained earnings
financing. 1 4 Managers thus have an incentive to devise ways to reduce
shareholder pressure to distribute earnings. 5
MYRON S. SCHOLES & MARK A. WOLFSON, TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A PLANNING APPROACH
185-91 (1992).
102. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 96, at 345 (outlining costs of external financing). One variant
of this argument is the "pecking order" theory, which examines how shareholders will react to information
about managers' financing choice, assuming that managers have more information and that managers are
selecting the method of financing that maximizes the value of existing equity. When managers are better
informed than the market, the market will view external financing as a signal that managers think the firm
is overvalued. A new equity issue thus will depress the price of existing equity. The signaling effect of
financing, it is argued, creates a "pecking order" with internal financing being preferred to debt and debt
to external financing. See Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment
Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187 (1984); cf.
BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 96, at 345 (discussing one study of almost 9000 new issues done between
1960 and 1987 that found average underpricing of 16%) (citing R.G. Ibbotson et al., Initial Public
Offerings, 1 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 37 (1988)). But see JEAN HELWEGE & NELLIE LANG, FEDERAL
RESERVE BOARD, FINANCE AND ECONOMICS DISCUSSION SERIES, PAPER No. 94-22, Is THERE A PECKING
ORDER? EVIDENCE FROM A PANEL OF IPO FIRMS 16-21 (1994) (presenting empirical study failing to
confirm pecking order theory). Even if correct, the "pecking order" theory does not alter our analysis. First,
shareholders will not prefer retained earnings financing if information is only slightly asymmetric--as is
generally the case with publicly traded firms subject to regular disclosure requirements. See Milton Harris
& Arthur Raviv, The Theory of Capital Structure, 46 J. FIN. 297, 306-11 (1991). In addition, even if
information is asymmetric, shareholders will unambiguously prefer internal financing only if.they assume
managers are pursuing firm interests. Otherwise, monitoring concerns (and a desire to shift the risk of bad
projects to others) may produce a shareholder preference for external financing. Finally, the impact of
asymmetric information on shareholder preferences for retained earnings does not alter our claim that some
managers still will benefit from the retained earnings trap created by the double tax. In addition to causing
shareholders to prefer retained earnings to dividend distributions, the double tax reduces the rate of return
that shareholders require of projects the firm finances with retained earnings to a point below that of the
external projects the shareholder might invest in if the firm distributed the earnings. See infra Subsection
W.C.I.
103. See Adler, supra note 97 (discussing how managers sometimes use unsecured financing, with the
attendant increase in creditor monitoring, to bond themselves to shareholders).
104. The empirical evidence generally supports the idea that, absent taxes, investors would prefer
dividends over retained earnings. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 96, at 385-86; Jean Crockett & Irwin
Friend, Dividend Policy in Perspective: Can Theory Explain Behavior, 70 REV. ECON. & STAT. 603,
611-12 (1988); Chinmoy Ghosh & J. Randall Woolridge, An Analysis of Shareholder Reaction to Dividend
Cuts and Omissions, II J. FIN. RES. 281, 292-93 (1988). But see Merton H. Miller & Myron S. Scholes,
Dividends and Taxes, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 333, 333-42 (1978) (finding no investor preference for dividends
even when taxes are taken into account).
105. The separation of ownership and control is a central feature of the American corporate system,
but it by no means characterizes all advanced industrial financial regimes. In particular, financial
intermediaries in both Germany and Japan hold extensive equity interests and are generally thought to
exercise significant control over companies they own. Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate
Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993). Our thesis seems to imply
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B. How the Double Tax Can Trap Earnings
The double tax can reduce shareholder pressure to distribute dividends.
3 6
Managers can more easily use retained earnings to finance new projects. °7
The double tax may even cause shareholders to accept a lower pretax rate of
return on internal firm investment projects than on external investment
projects. This retained earnings trap, we argue, causes some managers to
oppose integration and support the double tax.'08
The double tax traps earnings only under certain conditions. Most
importantly, the tax traps earnings when the Code imposes a higher tax on
ordinary income earned by individuals than on corporate profits."' 9 Under
this rate structure, the taxes imposed on profits that are retained and reinvested
are lower than the taxes imposed on earnings distributed and reinvested by
shareholders. Thus, under the double tax, shareholders benefit by leaving
retained earnings in the corporation rather than receiving dividends.
Shareholders therefore require a lower pretax rate of return for investments
funded by retained earnings because these investments bear a lower tax burden.
that these countries should have an integrated tax system.
A cursory examination of foreign tax systems does tend to confirm the connection between double
taxation and separated ownership and control. The economics and politics of integration, however, are so
complex that we are reluctant to place much weight on simple comparisons. Extensive research is needed
even to answer the apparently straightforward question of whether another country has an integrated system.
The Treasury Department, for example, did not examine the Japanese system of integration in its recent
report, because it believed that Japan had recently adopted a classical double tax. DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY, INTEGRATION, supra note 10, at 159. In fact, however, the Japanese changes simply substituted
one system of partial integration for another. 5 DOiNG BUSINESS IN JAPAN pt. 10, at 4-5 (Zentaro Kitagawa
ed., Supp. 1995). The incentive effects of another country's tax system require even more careful study.
Germany, Britain, and France have partial integration systems that are structurally similar. Some observers,
though, believe that, because of features such as different rate structures, the three systems encourage very
different financial policies. See, e.g., MCLURE, supra note 10, at 51-69 (French and German systems
encourage some earnings retention, while British system does not).
Control by financial intermediaries, moreover, may not be equivalent to direct control by beneficial
owners. Control by intermediaries may simply shift the agency cost problem from the firm to the financial
intermediary. Recent work suggests that financial intermediaries in other systems, notably the Japanese, are
not exclusively, nor perhaps even primarily, occupied by monitoring on behalf of shareholders. See Ronald
J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding The Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance
and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871 (1993) (noting that intermediaries in part facilitate the
production process).
This is only a brief sample of potential problems in making international comparisons. Only a detailed
case study could demonstrate whether the experience of another country is consistent with our argument.
106. See infra note 124 (noting that most, but not all, scholars agree that double tax can trap earnings).
107. Indeed, in certain circumstances the double tax will cause shareholders to prefer that firms finance
projects from retained earnings, rather than employing external financing, notwithstanding the deductibility
of interest on debt. See AMERICAN LAW INST., INTEGRATION, supra note 8, at 28-33.
108. The double tax is not the only solution to the incompatible preferences problem. Managers have
also lobbied successfully for legal rules that reduce, without eliminating, shareholder ability to monitor
managers and pressure them to distribute earnings. See, e.g., Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 38,
at 530-66; Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. Rnv. 10, 19
(1991); Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 111, 180-84 (1987).
109. The rates applicable to corporate income are found in I.R.C. § 11(b) (West 1995). The rates
applicable to personal income are found in id. § 1. Dividends are defined by id. § 316, and explicitly
included in taxable personal income by id. § 61(a)(7).
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RETAINED EARNINGS DIVIDENDS
YEAR 1 $1000 $1000(1 - .418) = $582
YEAR 2
PRETAX RErURN $1000 + $100 = $1100 $582 + $58.2 = $640.20
REUNAITERRTR ATEX $1000 + $100(1 
-. 35) = $1065 N/ACORPORATE TAx





This basic retained earnings trap can be illustrated with a simple
example. t0 Consider a firm with $1000 of earnings per shareholder. Assume,
for the sake of simplicity, that the rate of return on capital is 10% for both
corporations and shareholders."' The top corporate tax rate is 35%, as it is
at present. Assume that the individual tax rate is 41.8%, the approximate
marginal tax rate imposed on an average wealthy taxpayer.112  If the
corporation retains the earnings and invests them, the net profit to the
110. For a more precise explanation of the retained earnings trap, consider a shareholder of a
corporation that has Y dollars of after-tax earnings. The corporation is deciding whether to retain the
earnings for a project that earns the competitive return on corporate capital, R, or to distribute the funds
to shareholders, who will invest the money outside the corporate sector, earning r. If the firm retains the
earnings, all earnings will eventually be distributed to shareholders as dividends. The net annual return on
these retained earnings will be R(1 - c), where c is the corporate tax rate. This will compound for n years,
after which time it will be distributed as a dividend and taxed at the personal tax rate, p. Shareholders will
have, after all taxes are paid: Retained Earnings (1 - p) Y [1 + R(1 - c)]. If the corporation distributes the
earnings immediately, the shareholder pays an immediate tax at the personal rate p on the distribution, Y.
The shareholder will reinvest the distribution, earning an after-tax return of r(1 - p). After n years, the
shareholder will have: Distributed Earnings (1 - p) Y [1 + r(1 - p)]'. Shareholders will prefer the policy
that maximizes their expected wealth. If the expected rate of return in the corporate sector equals that in
the noncorporate sector (R = r), and the corporate and personal tax rates are equal (c = p), the
shareholder's wealth after y years will be the same whether earnings are retained or distributed: (1 - p) Y
[I + R(1 - c)J" = (1 - p) Y [1 + 41 - p)f. The double corporate tax accordingly will not affect the
shareholder's preference for retained earnings over distributions. If the individual tax rate instead exceeds
the corporate rate, the double tax traps retained earnings. The tax-induced benefit to the shareholder of
retained earnings over dividends is an additional (1 -p) Y [r(p - c)P in year n. The shareholder, therefore,
will prefer earnings retention to distribution. See AMERICAN LAW INST., INTEGRATION, supra note 8, at
28-33; SCHOLES & WOLFSON, supra note 101, at 328-30; see also MCLURE, supra note 10, at 24.
111. The present example assumes that the rates of return in the corporate and noncorporate sectors
are the same in order to isolate the effect of the double tax.
112. This estimation of the marginal personal rate is based on a base marginal rate of 36%, plus the
3.6% surcharge imposed on wealthier taxpayers, plus 1.2% (which represents the loss of $30 of itemized
deductions per $1000 earned), plus approximately 1% (which is the resulting loss of 2% of the taxpayer's
personal deductions per $2500 earned and assumes two personal deductions).
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shareholder in Year 2 will be $37.83. If the firm distributes the earnings and
the shareholder invests them, he will have a net profit of $33.90.
Thus, in our example, the double tax imposes a penalty of 10.4% on
shareholders who receive dividends rather than leaving their money in the
corporation." 3 This additional burden on dividend distributions increases the
cost to shareholders of the additional monitoring from external financing. The
double tax thus creates a retained earnings trap, thereby helping managers by
reducing shareholder preference for dividend distributions.1 4 Moreover, the
double tax lowers the rate of return shareholders require on internal funds."5
In our example, shareholders would prefer an internal project with a return just
over 9% to an external project with a return of 10%.16 The double tax thus
enables managers to pursue investments that yield below-market rates of
return."
7
113. Net profit refers to the one-year profit on the shareholder's net retained earnings of $582. The
profit is calculated based on net retained earnings ($1000 - $418 in taxes), because it is assumed that,
whether the earnings are distributed now or later, the shareholder will have to pay taxes on them at the
personal rate of 41.8%.
114. The discussion in the text implicitly assumes that, if the firm distributes earnings, it will not
undertake the new corporate investment. However, the basic analysis is quite similar when the firm has
determined to undertake a particular investment and is deciding whether to employ retained earnings instead
of external funds. The double tax may cause shareholders to prefer that the firm pursue new investment
using retained earnings rather than distributing the earnings and financing the project through either debt
or new equity. Moreover, the circumstances where the double tax creates a preference for internal financing
are very similar to the circumstances where the tax traps retained earnings: Shareholders prefer internal
financing if the corporate rate is less than the personal rate. To see this, consider a shareholder's wealth
under these three alternative financial structures. If the interest rate on corporate borrowing equals the
competitive rate of return, shareholder wealth will be:
Retained Earnings: (1 - p) Y [1 + r (1 - c)]y
Debt: (1 - p) Y [I + r (1 - p)F
New Equity: (1 - p) Y [I + r(1 - c)(1 - p)
When c < p, retained earnings clearly are preferable to the other solutions. See AMERICAN LAW INST.,
INTEGRATION, supra note 8, at 25-28. If, as is likely, the corporate and noncorporate rates of return differ,
then the shareholder's returns from retained earnings and debt are:
Retained Earnings: (1 - p) Y [I + R(1 - c)iF
Debt: (I - p) Y [I + (R - r)(1 - c) + r (1 - p)f
If R > r, and c > p, then retained earnings are necessarily preferred to debt. Moreover, retained earnings
may still be preferred to debt if R < r, provided c > p.
115. MASIJS, supra note 42, at 85; see also Ronald W. Masulis & Brett Trueman, Corporate
Investment and Dividend Decisions Under Differential Personal Taxation, 23 J. FiN. & QUAN. ANALYSIS
369, 369-70 (1988) (discussing relationship between dividend payouts and real asset investment, given
individual shareholders' tax situations and size of corporation's available internal funds).
116. The internal rate of return at which the shareholder would be indifferent between internal and
external projects (assuming a 10% rate of return on external projects) is the R such that: (.582)(1000)(1 +
R(.65)) = 615.90. R thus equals 9% in our example.
117. Specifically, under a classical double tax, managers deciding whether to engage in a particular
investment project will ask whether the project will raise share values by as much as it reduces the after-tax
dividend income of shareholders. Accordingly, managers will "undertake some investment projects which
do not raise the firm's value by the project's full cost." Poterba & Summers, supra note 79, at 270.
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In addition, the double tax may create a retained earnings trap even when
the corporate tax rate is equal to or greater than the personal rate. First, the
double tax may create a retained earnings trap if the pretax rate of return in the
corporate sector exceeds that in the noncorporate sector.1 Moreover, the
double tax is likely to cause corporate sector rates of return to exceed
noncorporate sector rates of return. Equilibrium requires that the after-tax rates
of return of the two sectors be equal. Accordingly, when the corporate sector
is subject to a double tax but the noncorporate sector is not, the pretax rate of
return on corporate sector investments should generally exceed that of the
noncorporate sector. Thus, even if the personal rate and corporate rate are
equal, shareholders will prefer that the firm retain earnings, rather than
distribute them to shareholders to invest outside the corporate sector, because
retention and distribution bear the same total tax burden but corporate
investments earn a higher pretax rate of return."9
Second, even if the personal tax rate is below the corporate rate, the
double tax will trap retained earnings if shareholders plan to reinvest dividend
distributions in the corporate sector.120 In fact, many shareholders will
reinvest in the corporate sector.121 In this situation, the "double tax" imposes
a triple tax on earnings reinvested in another corporation. Earnings are taxed
once on distribution; when reinvested in a corporation, the resulting profits are
taxed again at the corporate level and a third time when distributed. Retained
earnings, by contrast, are only taxed twice. The double tax thus traps some
earnings that would be reinvested in the corporate sector even if the personal
tax rate is less than the corporate rate."
118. In this situation, the tax-induced benefit to the shareholder of retaining earnings rather than
distributing them is (1 - p) Y [R(I - c) - r (1 - p)]. Indeed, the double tax may cause the shareholder to
prefer earnings retention even if the pretax return in the corporate sector is less than the pretax return
outside the corporate sector. In our example, the shareholder will prefer retained earnings if the corporate
rate of return, R, exceeds r[(] - p)1(1 - c)], which is less than r, assuming c < p.
119. Driving this result is the fact that equilibrium rates of return may be based on initial investments
of capital, where the noncorporate sector pays a single tax, whereas corporate shareholders investing
dividends in the noncorporate sector still must pay the double tax on those distributions. ("Noncorporate
sector" is used loosely here to refer to businesses not subject to the double tax.)
120. The standard analysis assumes that shareholders invest dividend distributions outside the corporate
sector. See, e.g., AMERIcAN LAW INST., INTEGRATION, supra note 8, at 28-33.
121. First, shareholders of publicly held firms often will be seeking passive liquid investments; most
noncorporate investments are less liquid, and many require owners to be more actively involved in the
business. Second, shareholders of publicly held firms may want to retain the limitation on liability
associated with corporate investments. Third, an investor who has achieved the optimal balance of risk and
return should not reinvest all dividends in Treasury securities, with their low risk and low return.
122. KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 89, at 372-73. Consider our previous example, but assume that the
shareholder reinvests all distributed earnings within the corporate sector. For ease of comparison, we will
assume that this second firm distributes all of its earnings (and the shareholder's initial investment) in the
last period. Assuming a one-year investment horizon, this can be expressed algebraically as follows:
Retained Earnings: (1 - p) Y [I + R(I - c)]
Distributed Earnings: (1 - p) Y [1 + R(1 - c)(1 - p)]
The double tax thus traps earnings even if the personal tax rate is less than the corporate rate.
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The double tax therefore can bring shareholders' tastes closer to those of
managers by increasing shareholder desire for internal financing and firm
expansion. This benefit to managers would be lost in a system of pure pass-
through taxation. Similarly, the partial integration plans that have been put
before Congress also would eliminate-or even reverse-the retained earnings
trap, increasing shareholder pressure for dividend payments12 In the next
section we examine whether the desire to trap earnings has in fact induced
managers actively to support the double tax.
C. Do Managers Support the Double Tax to Trap Earnings?
Managers will not necessarily support the double tax simply because it
traps earnings. A manager will oppose integration in order to keep the retained
earnings trap only if the double tax traps earnings in his firm and he benefits
from the trap. In this section, we argue that both criteria are met in only a
relatively small number of cases. Although the double tax traps earnings in
most firms, most managers do not benefit from the trap.
1. Does the Double Tax Trap Earnings?
Throughout the history of the income tax, the double tax has trapped the
earnings of a significant number of firms.124 Earnings are trapped whenever
123. Although not all partial integration proposals would eliminate the retained earnings trap, those
integration proposals that have been put before Congress would. The dividend exclusion method, which
has been considered often, would tax all income at the corporate level but would permit taxpayers to
exclude dividend income from their taxable income. Both retained and distributed earnings would therefore
be taxed at statutory corporate rates. Such a plan would in general reduce the lock-in effect (although one
can be designed that retains a lock-in effect). Two other partial integration methods that have been proposed
as legislation, an imputation credit and a dividend deduction, are quite similar. Both systems would tax all
corporate income at only one level. Like a pure integration system, both would tax distributed earnings at
the personal rate. Both, however, would tax retained earnings at the corporate rate. The simplest versions
of both systems (and the versions actually introduced) would have some element of double taxation.
Retained earnings would be subject to a second level of tax---albeit a deferred one-at the time of sale.
Even if corporate and personal income were taxed at the same rates, retained earnings would sometimes
be taxed more heavily than dividends. Thus, both plans would reverse the retained earnings trap and
encourage the distribution of profits.
124. The proposition that the double tax creates a retained earnings trap is widely asserted. See, e.g.,
AMERICAN LAW INST., INTEGRATION, supra note 8, at 28-33 (noting that classical double tax has
historically favored retention of earnings); Levmore, supra note 15, at 257 (tax system encourages retention
of earnings and therefore growth); Zolt, supra note 8, at 843-44; cf. Mark Campisano & Roberta Romano,
Recouping Losses: The Case for Full Loss Offsets, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 709 (1981) (analyzing effect of loss
offsets on firm growth). The question of whether the trap should induce managers to support double
taxation has not been extensively examined, however. A few leading tax scholars have argued that the
double tax does not create a retained earnings trap. See, e.g., KING, supra note 23, at 50-51, 108-110; Alan
J. Auerbach, Debt, Equity, and the Taxation of Corporate Cash Flows, in DEBT, TAXES, AND CORPORATE
RESTRUCrURING 91, 95 (John B. Shoven & Joel Waldfogel eds., 1990); Alan J. Auerbach, Wealth
Maximization and the Cost of Capital, 93 Q. J. ECON. 433, 433-34 (1979); David Bradford, The Incidence
and Allocation Effects of a Tax on Corporate Distributions, 15 J. PUB. ECON. 1 (1981); Miller & Scholes,
supra note 104, at 360-61. These claims have been extensively analyzed and rejected by others. See, e.g.,
Martin Feldstein & Jerry Green, Why Do Companies Pay Dividends?, 73 AMER. EON. REV. 17, 18-19
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the personal tax rate exceeds the corporate rate, and the trap increases as the
gap between the personal and corporate rates widens.125 The history of the
statutory rate structure suggests that the U.S. tax code has trapped earnings
during some periods, but not others. Between 1939 and 1986, top personal
rates exceeded corporate rates, and the percentage of taxpayers whose marginal
rates exceeded the marginal corporate rate steadily increased 26 Since 1986,
however, the corporate and individual rates have been much closer together,
and until 1993, the corporate rate exceeded the top individual rate.
The statutory rate structure, however, is not an accurate guide to the
retained-earnings-trap effect. The retained earnings trap depends not on the
relative statutory tax rates on personal and corporate income, but on the
relative effective marginal rates. Many firms face effective marginal tax rates
that are substantially below the statutory corporate rate. The Internal Revenue
Code provides a variety of tax preferences, such as ACRS, that lower the
effective tax rate on new capital far below the statutory rate. Under current
law, tax preferences are not passed through to shareholders, and so they lower
the corporate rate relative to the personal rate. 27 Although the Code imposes
a nominally uniform rate on corporate income, the incidence of preferences
varies widely between corporations.1 21 The uneven distribution of preferences
means that different sectors face different effective tax rates. Even after 1986,
many firms faced effective marginal tax rates that were considerably lower
than the personal tax rate; thus, their earnings were trapped. Therefore, even
after 1986, managers of low-tax-rate firms should have continued to favor the
(1983); Poterba & Summers, supra note 79, at 230, 240. Moreover, the hypothesis that the current tax
system does impose a double tax on corporate income--and specifically a marginal tax on dividends--is
supported by the available empirical evidence. Id. at 274-75; see William M. Gentry, Taxes, Financial
Decisions and Organizational Form: Evidence from Publicly Traded Partnerships, 53 J. PuB. ECON. 223
(1994) (claiming that comparison of corporations to publicly traded limited partnerships subject to
partnership taxation suggests that double taxation of corporate income reduces dividend payments).
125. This is a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for the double tax to trap retained earnings.
See supra text accompanying notes 109-23.
126. In 1961, about 90% of all returns were taxed at a marginal rate below 22%; by 1979, that
marginal rate had risen to a high of 32%. During this time, the top personal rate fluctuated between 76%
and 90% while the corporate rate remained around 45%.
127. To see how, suppose a corporation earns Yin net income. From this the corporation is permitted
to deduct tax preferences in the amount a, leaving taxable income of Y - a and after-tax income of Y -
(Y - a)c. The tax preference a could be regarded in two ways. The preference amount a could be seen as
a contribution to corporate capital. If after-tax income were then distributed to shareholders, they would
exclude a from their income as a return of capital. Their total taxable income would be Y - (Y - a)c - a,
and the preference would have been extended to the shareholder level. In fact, however, a is not treated
as a contribution to capital at the corporate level, but instead increases earnings and profits. The entire
amount distributed to shareholders is therefore taxable. Under current law, then, tax preferences reduce the
tax rate on corporate-level income, but leave the tax rate on shareholder-level income unchanged.
128. Some items, such as percentage depletion, are in principle available only to firms in certain
industries. Other preferences, such as ACRS, are important only to firms with significant capital
requirements. Moreover, the depreciation allowances accorded to various assets differ in generosity, creating
different effective tax rates even among capital-intensive firms. Other tax preferences, such as the
completed contract and installment methods of accounting, are theoretically available generally, but are in
practice useful only to firms for which certain business practices make sense.
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double tax. In fact, after 1986, a few managers did continue explicitly to
oppose integration because of the retained earnings trap. t29
The statutory bracket amount is likewise an incomplete guide to the tax
rate that individuals face. Effective individual rates vary from person to person
and, for any given individual, between types of income. Some of these
variations increase the lock-in effect. Earnings retained by the firm may not
ultimately be distributed as dividends and taxed as ordinary income. Rather,
shareholders may obtain their earnings by selling their shares and receiving
their portion of the earnings as capital gains. The effective tax rate imposed on
earnings realized as capital gains will often be less than the rate imposed on
earnings received as ordinary income for several reasons: The maximum
statutory rate imposed on capital gains is only 28%; capital gains, unlike
dividends, can be used to offset capital losses; and shareholders can avoid all
capital gains taxation by holding shares until death. 30 The lower tax on
retained earnings increases the lock-in effect.
The effective rate structure of the U.S. tax system therefore suggests that
many firms have faced a retained earnings trap even after 1986. Statutory rates
can also overstate the retained earnings trap, however. Effective rates suggest
that some firms did not face a trap even before 1986. Some firms face
unusually high effective corporate tax rates. Such high rates can result, for
example, from high taxes on foreign income. Perhaps more importantly, not
all taxpayers face the top statutory rate assumed by the previous analysis. Top-
bracket taxpayers hold a disproportionate share of common stock' but far
from all of it. Indeed, with the growth of pension funds, tax-exempt
organizations hold significant amounts'32 of corporate equity. Low-tax-
129. See R. Eliot Rosen, Treasury's Corporate Integration Study Back on Track, 49 TAX NOTES 956,
956 (1990). Many analysts had expected that managerial support for integration would increase after 1986.
Comprehensive Analysis, supra note 94, at G-5 (quoting Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Kenneth
Gideon). Corporate support for integration did increase, but not substantially. See Leveraged Buyouts, Daily
Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 93, at G-6 (May 16, 1987). Since companies' opposition had been based
on concerns about the expense of windfall profits, the 1986 Act did nothing to change their perspective.
130. See I.R.C. § 1014 (West 1995). Accordingly, a shareholder who plans to hold most of his assets
until death can avoid a substantial portion of the capital gains tax imposed on those assets. See, e.g., JANE
G. GRAVELLE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CORPORATE TAX
INTEGRATION: ISSUES AND OPTIONS 5-8 (1991); SCHOLES & WOLFSON, supra note 101, at 75 n.24.
131. Historically, most of the stock held in the personal sector has been held by the top 1% (or 1 %)
of adult wealth holders. JAMES BURK, VALUES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE AIERICAN STOCK MARKET
UNDER FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 164 (1988) (presenting data on holdings between 1922 and 1972).
Moreover, the top 1% of taxpayers have received almost 50% of corporate dividends. See Griffith, supra
note 9, at 717-22 (analyzing relative preferences for corporate equity of top- and lower-bracket taxpayers).
See generally SCHOLES & WOLFSON, supra note 101, at 63 (discussing complications in determining
shareholder tax rate).
132. In 1993, pension funds owned approximately 31.3% of all outstanding U.S. equities; mutual funds
(which generally also are tax exempt) owned another 10.3%. MARK ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK
OwNERS 125 (1994). Institutional investors as a group owned about 43.5% of the total equities outstanding
in the United States as of the end of 1989. RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES
AND MATERIALS 16-17 (7th ed. 1992). For a discussion of institutional investors' ability to influence
corporate tax policy, see infra Section V.A.
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bracket shareholders are more likely than high-bracket shareholders to want
dividend distributions. These different preferences for dividends produce a
"clientele effect": Each corporation will tend to attract shareholders with
similar characteristics who prefer a similar payout ratio.133 To attract
shareholders, some firms must appeal to lower-bracket investors with a strong
preference for dividends,' 34 while others appeal to high-bracket investors who
prefer retained earnings. 35 Managers of firms with a low-bracket clientele
will not be motivated by the trap to support double taxation. For them, the
double tax not only fails to trap earnings, it also raises their cost of capital and
can even create pressure to distribute earnings. Accordingly, managers of such
firms should favor integration.
136
2. Why Most Managers Will Not Support the Double Tax
Even managers of firms that do face a retained earnings trap will not
necessarily favor double taxation. Managers support the double tax only if their
interests diverge from those of shareholders. This divergence will be common
in publicly held firms. Most corporations, however, are closely held, and the
manager-owners of these firms have a direct stake in firm projects. They thus
have every incentive to maximize firm profits and little or no incentive to
pursue non-profit-maximizing expansionist policies. 13
7
Even many managers of publicly held firms should not support the double
tax. For many managers, the costs of the double tax will exceed the benefits
of the retained earnings trap. Managers benefit from the double tax if they can
finance new projects with retained earnings; they do not benefit if their firm's
investment projects exceed available earnings, so that external financing is
required anyway. The quest for new capital constrains managers' ability to
133. See Miller & Modigliani, supra note 93, at 431-32 (discussing possibility of "clientele" effect).
See generally J. FRED WESTON & THOMAS E. COPELAND, MANAGERIAL FINANCE 698-701 (9th ed. 1992)
(discussing clientele effect).
134. A low-bracket shareholder's preference for dividends will depend in part on whether he plans
to reinvest in the corporate sector. See supra text accompanying notes 120-23.
135. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 96, at 388-89. Firms with high effective tax rates-which
do not benefit from retained earnings-may also be the firms that pay high dividends to attract shareholders
with a strong preference for dividends.
136. Although the double tax may create a retained earnings trap even if the personal rate is less than
the corporate rate, see supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text, the double tax will not trap retained
earnings if the personal rate is sufficiently below the corporate rate. Thus, the double tax probably does
not trap earnings of firms with very low-bracket marginal shareholders, such as pension plans.
137. Similarly, managers of firms with concentrated ownership have less reason than others to support
the double tax in the quest for retained earnings. When control is concentrated, shareholders are better able
to monitor managers. See Demsetz & Lehn, supra note 87, at 1158-60. When shareholders can monitor
managers effectively, managers have less to gain from the retained earnings trap because shareholders can
oversee their use of these earnings. Accordingly, these managers have less reason to support the double tax,
because the tax increases the cost of external capital and gives them little benefit in the form of reduced
monitoring. The tax may confer some benefit on these managers, however, because it does increase
shareholders' preference for firm expansion relative to external investment projects.
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employ internal funds on suboptimal projects. Firms earning suboptimal returns
may have difficulty obtaining additional equity, except at a significant
discount. Firms with suboptimal projects may also find debt financing more
expensive, since their risk of insolvency is higher. Accordingly, the double tax
does not enable these managers to avoid the monitoring of new investments
by the capital markets.
Moreover, the double tax may make outside financing of new investments
more expensive. Only interest payments, not dividends, are deductible. A
double tax on returns to corporate capital thus increases the cost of externally
financed new investments to the extent that those investments must be financed
with new equity rather than new debt. 3 '
Finally, managers of firms dependent on external financing may find that
the double tax exacerbates a conflict with shareholders that would exist even
in the absence of taxes. The deductibility of interest on corporate debt
obligations increases shareholder pressure to debt finance these additional
projects. Debt creates the risk of default and bankruptcy. Consequently, risk-
neutral shareholders have a greater taste for debt financing than do risk-averse
managers. 3
9
The importance of each of these factors will vary widely between firms.
Firms differ greatly in their ability to issue debt. Large, mature firms can
readily obtain debt financing at competitive rates. They face little risk of
138. Even some investments financed with debt may effectively bear the double tax. For example,
firms with significant nondebt tax shields, such as accelerations depreciation, depreciation allowances, and
investment and foreign tax credits, may not be able to utilize fully their interest deductions. At some point,
these firms may find that any external financing, debt or equity, will be subject to the full double tax. This
significantly affects the cost to the firm of this financing. See Harry DeAngelo & Ronald W. Masulis,
Optimal Capital Structure Under Corporate and Personal Taxation, 8 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 7-10 (1980). Even
those firms that can easily obtain debt financing cannot employ it to eliminate the burden of the double tax
on equity. When the firm's rate of return exceeds the interest rate on debt-which is the very situation
where debt is particularly attractive to equity--equity bears the full double tax on its share of the return.
SCHOLES & WOLFSON, supra note 101, at 377.
139. In addition to the tax benefits of leverage, shareholders may benefit from increased leverage
because they receive all the resulting residual profit (thus increasing the expected earnings stream per
share), while debt holders bear part of the risk. Easterbrook, supra note 96, at 653; see KLEIN & COFFEE,
supra note 89, at 7-11. See generally BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 96, at 404-05 (discussing effects
of leverage on returns). Shareholders may also prefer debt because the transaction costs associated with
large debt issues, particularly issues of nonconvertible debt, are substantially lower than those associated
with large equity issues. See MASULIS, supra note 42, at 6-7 (noting that floatation costs are lower for
nonconvertible debt issues than for equity issues or convertible debt issues, both for issues under $1 million
and for issues over $100 million). In addition, newly issued equity generally is subject to a substantial
discount and may cause a decline in existing share prices. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 96, at 345,
349 & n.21. Finally, shareholders will prefer certain types of debt financing to issuing new equity because
certain types of debt financing, for example bank loans, appear to be associated with more ongoing
monitoring. See Eugene F. Fama, What's Different About Banks?, 15 J. MONETARY ECON. 29, 37-38
(1985) (suggesting that banks can monitor loans to depositors at lower costs than other lenders can); Scott
L. Lummer & John J. McConnell, Further Evidence on the Bank Lending Process and the Capital-Market
Response to Bank Loan Agreements, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 99 (1989) (discussing empirical evidence supporting
view that banks gain information about clients over time and transmit it to capital markets through loan
renewal process); see also Laura Lin, The Information Content of a Bank's Involvement in Private
Workouts, 3 GEO. MASON IND. L. REv. 97, 100, 106-18 (1994) (examining role of banks as well-informed
monitors in lessening problem of imperfect information of other creditors in private workouts).
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insolvency because of their well-established earnings streams and substantial
physical assets. 40 Debt financing, however, substantially increases the risk
of insolvency for emerging firms, undiversified firms, firms with highly
variable income streams, and firms with few tangible assets.'4 ' Managers of
such companies are therefore unlikely to support the double tax.
A given level of debt will also subject different firms to different levels
of monitoring. Managers of firms with substantial physical assets can avoid
much of the monitoring associated with debt by having their firms issue
secured debt. Secured credit enables the creditor to evaluate only the value of
the collateral, not the value of the firm as a going concern.' 42 Companies
without much physical capital can obtain debt only by agreeing to significant
levels of monitoring. For managers of these firms, therefore, the double tax
only exacerbates shareholder pressure to assume high levels of debt and submit
to outside monitoring by creditors.
D. Evidence
The historical pattern of effective tax rates1 43 suggests that some firms
have faced a retained earnings trap for most of the last fifty years. Firms in
this position have produced a small but influential group of managers who
have opposed integration in order to preserve the retained earnings trap.
These managers have expressed concerns about pressure to pay dividends
from the time the first integration measures were introduced by Secretary
Simon and Representative Ullman.'" Each successive iteration of the 1986
140. See Nevins D. Baxter, Leverage, Risk of Ruin and the Cost of Capital, 22 J. FiN. 395, 402 (1967).
141. See Knoll, supra note 63, at 1491-97.
142. See Adler, supra note 97, at 75, 82-83 (noting that secured credit saves evaluation and
monitoring resources); F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REv. 1393, 1421-26,
1439-46 (1986) (same); Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities
among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1153 (1979) (same); Levmore, supra note 97, at 55-57 (same); see
also George G. Triantis, Secured Debt under Conditions of Imperfect Information, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 225,
249-55 (1992) (discussing security as mechanism for mitigating information asymmetries).
143. The history of integration efforts confirms that effective tax rates, not statutory rates, determine
the size of the retained earnings trap. Between 1986 and 1993, the change in statutory rates implied a
reversal of the lock-in effect, and a corresponding surge in support for integration. However, support for
integration after 1986 continued to come from the same firms and organizations as before, such as firms
in highly taxed industries, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the American Council for Capital
Formation. See Fran Hawthorne, Would Cutting the Dividend Tax Really Help?, INSTITUIONAL INVESTOR,
Aug. 1990, at 73 (quoting MCI's executive vice president that "double taxation (of corporate dividends]
has no economic justification or rationale"); Pullen, supra note 13, at 12; Taxleads, Daily Rep. for
Executives (BNA) No. 131, at H-i (July 9, 1990). These groups still placed a much lower priority on
integration than on other reform measures. See Levin, supra note 76, at 49. Their principal motive for
giving less than full support for integration had not been a desire to protect the retained earnings trap but
a concern-left unchanged by the 1986 reforms-about windfalls.
144. See Jonas, supra note 19, at 38; Policies to Spur Investment and Trade, Bus. WEEK, June 30,
1980, at 127, 130 [hereinafter Policies]. Both Representative Ullman and Secretary Simon stressed that their
proposals would increase the tax costs of retaining earnings. Finance Hearings, supra note 19, at 71
(testimony of William Simon, Secretary of the Treasury); 124 CONG. REC. 2132 (1978) (statement of Rep.
Ullman). Some believe that managerial desire to trap earnings first surfaced in the battle over the 1936
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reform bill reduced the amount of integration proposed, and the final version
that emerged from conference contained none at all. Many observers believe
that the behind-the-scenes intervention of the Business Roundtable killed the
1986 integration measure. 45 The Roundtable was apparently motivated by
opposition to integration, rather than by fear that the price of integration would
be excessive.146 Managerial desire to preserve the earnings trap was
expressed in the response to the recent Treasury integration study. For the
corporate community to support integration, one executive said that "corporate
managers' decisions to retain or distribute earnings should not be unduly
burdened."' 147
An influential segment of managers clearly wishes to trap earnings. At the
same time, most managers do not seem to regard the retained earnings trap as
a sufficient reason to oppose integration, and managers whose fear of excessive
debt more than offsets any desire for the retained earnings trap actually support
it. During congressional hearings on both the Simon and Ullman proposals,
managers who testified-always in favor of integration-invariably gave as
their principal reason the problem of excessive leverage. 4 The 1986 letters
supporting integration 49 stressed the problems associated with the preference
for debt, especially the problem of bankruptcy costs. Since the 1986 reforms,
managers who support integration have continued to cite their fear of excessive
leverage 50 and difficulty obtaining debt.'
Revenue Act. The Act eliminated the personal deduction for dividends received, see Revenue Act of 1936,
ch. 690, § 25, Pub. L. No. 74-740, 49 Stat. 1648, 1661-62 (compare with prior § 25), provided corporations
with a deduction for dividends paid, see id. § 27, and augmented the normal corporate tax with a tax on
undistributed corporate profits, see id. § 14(b). The tax was eliminated altogether in 1939. See Revenue Act
of 1939, ch. 247, § 201, Pub. L. No. 76-155, 53 Stat. 862, 863-64. Some policy analysts supported the tax
because they hoped that it would create pressure to pay dividends, and managers may have opposed the
tax because of the pressure to pay out earnings. See Mark J. Roe, Political Elements in the Creation of a
Mutual Fund Industry, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1469, 1496-98 (1991). However, policy analysts had other
reasons to support the tax, such as a Keynesian desire to stimulate consumption, and managers had other
reasons to oppose it, including the overall increase it produced in the tax burden on corporations. SIDNEY
RATNER, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 472-74 (Science ed., Wiley & Sons 1967) (1942); see
also Roe, supra, at 1497 (discussing supporters' managerial discipline and increased consumer spending
rationales).
145. Saunders, supra note 65, at 192. Yet even the Business Roundtable at one point endorsed a
dividend deduction. See Policies, supra note 144, at 131.
146. The Roundtable evidently preferred the version of reform that passed, which included significant
cuts in ACRS, to a version that, identical in all other respects, also provided for integration.
147. Rosen, supra note 129, at 956 (paraphrasing Bob Mattson of IBM).
148. This was true of the Simon proposal hearings. See Finance Hearings, supra note 19, at 389, 391
(statement of George S. Koch, Chairman, Federal Finance Committee, Council of State Chambers of
Commerce); id. at 1257, 1271 (statement of Charles W. Stewart, President, Machinery and Allied Products
Institute); id. at 1291, 1301-02 (statement of Malcolm R. Lovell, Jr., President, Rubber Manufacturers
Association); id. at 1335, 1344 (statement of Norma Pace, Senior Vice President, American Paper Institute).
It was likewise true of the Ullman hearings. See House Hearings, supra note 81, at 6064-75, 6069-70
(statement of Roland M. Bixler, National Association of Manufacturers); id. at 6110-11 (statement of
William S. Cashel, Vice Chairman and Chief Financial Officer, AT&T); id. at 6111-14 (statement of Henry
L. Duncombe, Jr., Vice President and Chief Economist, GM).
149. See supra note 72.
150. See Hawthorne, supra note 143, at 73.
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM
Integration is more likely to succeed if reformers have at least one major
interest group as an ally.'52 To this end, we propose that reformers adopt a
three-part strategy. First, they should support corporate governance proposals
that empower shareholders. Second, they should consider endorsing plans that
make integration more attractive to managers. Finally, reformers should deny
support to proposals that enable a select group of firms to avoid the double
tax, as this would reduce the political pressure for integration of corporate
sector taxes.
A. Shareholders
Shareholders have never played an active role in the debates on corporate
taxation. This silence results largely from their lack of effective representation.
Shareholders typically are too dispersed to exert significant control over
corporate investment decisions or to lobby Congress directly. 5 3 Even large
shareholders have seldom lobbied Congress on behalf of shareholders
generally. As Mark Roe and others have persuasively argued, the financial
intermediaries that might voice shareholder concerns have been discouraged
from participating in political debate. 54 Nor has the recent growth of pension
funds provided an effective vehicle for the expression of shareholder interests.
Although pension funds, which are tax exempt, would unambiguously benefit
from many forms of integration,'55 they cannot lobby actively for integration.
151. In a 1990 survey, electronics industry executives expressed disapproval of double taxation. Not
coincidentally, executives reported a need for massive amounts of new capital and expected to use primarily
equity. Bruce C.P. Rayner, How U.S. Electronics CEOs Will Address the New Competitive Priorities,
ELECTRONIC Bus., Mar. 19, 1990, at 34-35.
152. Not all laws can be explained solely by interest group politics. Legislators do act in the public
interest, and their efforts do sometimes overcome the obstacles of special interest groups. See generally
Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 AM. ECON.
REv. 279 (1984) (exploring significance of public interest objectives in economic policymaking).
Nonetheless, a wise legislator will consider opportunities to enlist the support, and minimize the opposition,
of interest groups.
153. See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 39, at 308-10, 356 (discussing positive aspects of
agency cost theory with respect to relations between managers and outside debt and equity holders).
154. See Roe, supra note 144, at 1471-78. See generally ROE, supra note 132 (discussing interaction
between politics and corporate governance). Most importantly, various laws combine to inhibit institutional
investors from obtaining sufficient control of individual corporations to affect firm lobbying. See, e.g., id.
at 51-146, 223 (providing historical data indicating that institutional investors own shares in small,
unconcentrated blocks and that various laws discourage institutions from exerting control); Black, Agents,
supra note 38, at 822-24 (detailing legal obstacles to institutional shareholder action); Roe, supra note 108,
at 16-31 (detailing laws that impede institutions from either obtaining controlling position in any given firm
or combining with other institutions to exert control). But cf. Ethan G. Stone, Note, Must We Teach
Abstinence? Pensions' Relationship Investments and the Lessons of Fiduciary Duty, 94 COLUM. L. REv.
2222 (1994) (arguing that ERISA fiduciary duties are not impediment to relationship investing).
155. Tax-exempt institutions, however, would derive little benefit from dividend-exclusion integration
because currently the dividends they receive are not taxable. Yet dividend-exclusion integration is the
version that is particularly attractive to individual shareholders. Rational shareholders prefer dividend
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The Department of Labor interprets the rules governing the fiduciary
obligations of pension trustees quite strictly1-6 and would strenuously object
to significant lobbying expenditures. In addition, private pension fund
managers are hired by the firm's management and thus are reluctant to lobby
for reforms that management does not support. 15 7 Finally, because pension
funds are tax exempt, they are unlikely to support the form of integration most
likely to generate public support--dividend-exclusion plans.'58
In the short run, shareholders are unlikely to exert effective pressure for
integration.159 Still, tax reformers hoping for integration should support
policies to increase shareholders' independent political power. The political
voice of shareholders could be strengthened by many of the measures proposed
by Mark Roe,16° Bernard Black,16' and others162 to increase shareholder
influence over internal corporate governance. These reforms include permitting
political lobbying by pension funds; reducing restrictions on ownership
concentration such as the Glass-Steagall Act; 63 and permitting the easy
exclusion because it eliminates the retained earnings trap. Shareholders, whether perfectly informed and
rational or otherwise, also may prefer dividend-exclusion integration to integration plans that reduce
corporate-level taxes because they believe that they do not bear the corporate-level tax. Shareholders thus
would prefer dividend exclusion because it directly reduces the taxes they pay, whereas those plans that
reduce the corporate-level tax do not.
156. ERISA provides that "a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries and (A) for the exclusive purpose of (i) providing benefits to
participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)
(1988). The Department of Labor has construed this requirement narrowly to exclude all but the most
indispensable costs of a plan. Letter from Elliot I. Daniel, Associate Director for Regulations and
Interpretations, Department of Labor, Pension & Welfare Benefit Programs, to Kirk F. Maldonado (Mar.
2, 1987), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, ERISA file (characterizing many potential plan expenses as
nondeductible settlor expenses). No authority deals directly with the question of lobbying, but, in the words
of a senior Department of Labor official, "it would be hard to imagine circumstances in which lobbying
would be considered a reasonable expense of the plan." Telephone Conversation with Bette Briggs,
Division Chief, Fiduciary Interpretations and Regulations, Pension Benefits and Welfare Administration
(Oct. 19, 1995).
157. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate
Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1277, 1283 n.21, 1364-65 (1991); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and
(Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 469 & n.80 (1991); Roe,
supra note 108, at 24-25; see also Stone, supra note 154, at 2234 n.62 (noting problem that ERISA allows
corporate management to control the investment of its workers' pension funds).
158. See supra Section IJ.D.
159. Cf. Tax Legislation: JCT Chief Pearlman Says Possibility of Major Tax Bill in 1990 is Unclear,
Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 56, at G-I (Mar. 22, 1990) (paraphrasing Ronald Pearlman, Chief
of Staff for the Joint Committee on Taxation, as saying that "the future of the integration effort depends
not only on revenue considerations but also on the interest of the business community").
160. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 108, at 17-31 (arguing for concentrated institutional ownership); Roe,
supra note 144, at 1470-71 (suggesting that mutual funds concentrate shareholder power and provide
valuable checks on management).
161. See, e.g., Black, Agents, supra note 38, at 815-16 (proposing limited role for several institutions
to collectively influence corporate control); Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 38, at 523-25 (noting
that coordinated voting among institutions and scale economies are incentives for institutions to become
informed voters and monitor managers).
162. See, e.g., Alfred F. Conrad, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MicH. J.L. REF.
117, 163-67 (1988) (arguing institutional investors will enhance profitability and curb managerial
compensation expenses).
163. The current rules governing deductibility of debt and the current structure of debt ownership
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coordination of shareholder efforts now restricted by laws such as the Williams
Act.'6
B. Managers
Absent significant change in corporate governance laws, tax reformers
cannot rely on shareholder pressure for integration. For integration to succeed,
therefore, reformers will probably need the support of the only interest group
with the ability and the inclination to lobby Congress on this issue: corporate
managers.
Reformers can gain managerial support for integration by advancing
integration plans that serve managers' interests. Most managers of publicly
held firms are not opposed to integration in principle. Rather, they have little
enthusiasm for tax reforms, such as conventional integration schemes, that
provide windfalls to old capital. But windfalls are not an inevitable
consequence of all integration plans. In particular, Congress might minimize
windfalls by implementing integration in stages, as suggested by some
integration proponents.6e Phase-in would concentrate the tax benefits from
integration on new investments. Most managers thus should support such a
proposal.'66
Phased-in integration also makes sense from a policy perspective. Tax
analysts are perhaps even less enthusiastic than managers about windfalls,
since they, like managers, prefer measures that stimulate new investment.
Phased-in integration could also generate considerable popular support. The
public is especially receptive to tax subsidies such as ACRS that stimulate new
suggest that repealing the Glass-Steagall Act might promote integration. One puzzle for political analysts
of the tax code is that dividends are not deductible whereas interest payments on debt are. There are
reasons to question whether this is consistent with managers' interests, since managers generally are
assumed to prefer equity over debt. Managers are not the only powerful political force affecting the tax
treatment of debt, however. Banks and other financial institutions can, and do, own significant amounts of
debt. Moreover, banks are well organized and effective as lobbyists. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Markets,
Courts, and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 465, 497. To the extent that
pressure from these well-organized, powerful institutional players explains, at least in part, why debt
payments are subject to a single-level tax, it suggests that enabling banks to own equity may further the
cause of integration. But see Adler, supra note 21, at 346 (offering populist explanation for interest
deduction).
164. The Williams Act of 1968, which (among other things) regulates activities by owners of more
than 5% of certain classes of securities, amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and is codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 781--n (1994).
165. The most systematic proposal to eliminate windfalls from integration is articulated in AMERICAN
LAW INST., REPORTiER'S STUDY DRAFr, supra note 17, at 54-101. That proposal, written by Professor
William D. Andrews, provides an elegant method for granting integration treatment only to new equity.
Other proposals would simply phase in integration over time. These plans would provide some windfalls
to capital but would be easier to administer. See AMERICAN LAW INST., INTEGRATION, supra note 8, at
205-22; DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION, supra note 10, at 89-92.
166. One executive who supported the 1986 integration proposal specifically endorsed phase-in to
prevent windfalls and revenue loss. Companies Support Fifty Percent Dividends Paid Deduction, TAX
NOTES TODAY, May 14, 1985, at 86 (citing letter from Thomas M. Garvin, President of Keebler Co.).
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investments, and thus create jobs.167 Indeed, phased-in integration should
generate even more public support than measures, such as ACRS, that benefit
only physical capital and thus encourage firms to employ capital rather than
labor. In contrast, phased-in integration would benefit all forms of new
investment, including labor. Good policy often makes bad politics, but the two
in this case may coincide. We therefore believe that reformers should focus
their efforts on these phased-in integration schemes.
While many managers will support an integration plan as long as it
concentrates its tax benefits on new capital, confining the benefits of
integration to new capital will not win the support of all managers. Managers
who benefit from the retained earnings trap may oppose even phased-in
integration plans if those plans would reduce the trap. Whether an integration
plan that favors new investments could succeed despite this opposition is an
open question. The group of managers who benefits on net from the retained
earnings trap is relatively small. Nevertheless, this group includes managers of
some very large and established firms. Reformers may find that this group is
simply too influential to challenge, in which case they should consider
supporting integration plans that would trap earnings. These integration plans
would, it is true, fail to remove one of the principal inefficiencies associated
with the double tax, the retained earnings trap. 6 8 Nonetheless, these plans
would reduce or eliminate two other problems: the excess tax burden on the
corporate sector and the bias towards debt financing.169 Half a loaf may be
better than none, and so reformers might find it necessary to support
integration plans that do not eliminate the retained earnings trap.
Reformers who decide to preserve the retained earnings trap should be
alert to two issues in designing integration plans. First, earnings are more
likely to be trapped if preferences are limited to the corporate level of tax. The
simplest integration systems tend to equalize the personal and corporate rates
because they pass preferences through to shareholders. However, some
integration plans deny shareholders the benefits of preferences, 70 thereby
raising the personal rate relative to the corporate rate and thus increasing the
lock-in effect.17' Second, many early integration proposals would push out
167. See infra Appendix B, Table B.3.
168. Some observers may see a silver lining to this cloud. Partial integration proposals that retain the
corporate-level tax may be superior to pure pass-through taxation in some circumstances in that the entity-
level tax may reduce interinvestor conflicts and also certain manager-investor agency costs. See Kanda &
Levmore, supra note 15, at 230; Joseph A. Snoe, The Entity Tax and Corporate Integration: An Agency
Cost Analysis and a Call for a Deferred Distributions Tax, 48 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 7-20 (1993).
169. Whether tax reformers should support integration plans that do not eliminate the retained earnings
trap depends in part on the significance of the burden (if any) that the double tax imposes on the corporate
sector, aside from the burden imposed by the retained earnings trap.
170. This is accomplished by a surtax on previously untaxed preference income at the time of
distribution, either at the corporate or individual level.
171. Without preference pass-through, even a dividend exclusion plan can lock in earnings. The
dividend-exclusion method would tax all income at the corporate level but would permit taxpayers to
exclude dividend income from their taxable income. Both retained and distributed earnings would therefore
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earnings through the residual double taxation of retained earnings. A simple
imputation-credit or dividend-deduction system would tax distributed earnings
at the personal rate, and retained earnings at the corporate rate. Retained
earnings would be subject to a second level of tax-albeit a deferred one-at
the time of sale. Even if corporate and personal income were taxed at the same
rates, retained earnings might be taxed more heavily than dividends. The
element of double taxation, however, can be eliminated by a device, known as
a Dividend Reinvestment Plan, or DRIP, which would ensure that retained
earnings were taxed only at the corporate level.
1 2
Tax reformers can increase managerial support for integration by opposing
reforms that would permit selective avoidance of double taxation by some
firms. Such reforms will only weaken political pressure to integrate. 173 The
most important device for avoiding double taxation is the use of noncorporate
forms such as partnership and Subchapter S. Rebecca Rudnick first observed
that double taxation seemed to depend more on whether a firm was publicly
held than on whether it was organized as a corporation. 74 Rudnick
concluded that the benefits of access to securities markets formed the
normative basis for double taxation. Consequently, she endorsed, at least under
present conditions, double taxation of publicly held entities only. While we
agree with her observation, we believe that the connection between public
ownership and double taxation explains why we have the current tax code
rather than why we should retain it. The single-level taxation of closely held
be taxed at statutory corporate rates. Such a plan would in general reduce the lock-in effect But without
preference pass-through, dividend-exclusion systems would tax retained and distributed earnings at different
effective rates. Such a dividend-exclusion system received-for rather different reasons-the tentative
endorsement of the Treasury integration study. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION, supra
note 10, at 15, 17-25.
172. Under a DRIP, the corporate tax paid on retained earnings is attributed to shareholders by means
of a deemed dividend. This deemed dividend would increase shareholder basis, and therefore reduce gain
at the time of sale. A DRIP would thus reduce the effect of the tax system on the decision to retain or
distribute earnings. Any bias would be caused solely by the difference between corporate and personal
rates. Such an imputation credit system has been endorsed-on other grounds-by the ALI integration study
and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. See TAX DIVISION, AMERICAN INST. OF
CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, supra note 17, at 54-59, 63-67. In principle, a DRIP could also
supplement a dividend-deduction system. The principal difference between the imputation-credit and
dividend-deduction systems is administrative: An imputation-credit system uses corporate-level taxation of
dividends as a withholding regime. This difference makes a DRIP more sensible with an imputation-credit
system. Since the major advantage of the dividend-deduction system is simplicity, most proposed versions,
as well as the partial dividend-deduction system formerly in effect, would not use a DRIP or other basis
adjustments. Such adjustments would considerably complicate the system without providing the advantages
of withholding.
173. Piecemeal integration is particularly to be avoided if the managers who would oppose integration
because they favor retained earnings do not have sufficient political power to block across-the-board
integration under a phased-in integration plan that does eliminate the trap. Our conclusion that, in the
absence of full integration, the current double-tax system should be seriously enforced is shared by others,
although for different reasons. See, e.g., CORPORATE TAX REFORM, supra note 74, at 162 (comments of
Professor Michael Graetz, arguing that double taxation will remain because decreed by Congress despite
weight of tax policy analysis against it). This view seems to stem primarily from a respect for democratic
procedures and the rule of law. Leonard, supra note 65, at 891, 895.
174. See Rudnick, supra note 15, at 1099-1143.
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businesses reduces one of the few potentially powerful forces for integration.
We therefore believe that reformers should consider opposing the gradual
extension of Subchapter S and related innovations.
VI. CONCLUSION
The double taxation of corporate profits creates significant distortions in
the American economy. The two-tier tax discourages investment in the
corporate sector, encourages dangerous levels of corporate debt, and
encourages corporations to retain earnings.
The persistence of the corporate tax, we have argued, results from the
separation between the ownership and the management of large corporations.
To a limited extent, the tax persists because of the retained earnings trap. In
the absence of a corporate tax, shareholders will pressure managers to pay
dividends if the return on outside investments is higher than the return inside
the corporation. A two-tier tax reduces these pressures by bringing shareholder
objectives closer to those of management. Consequently, a small group of
managers who benefit from the tax vehemently oppose integration.
Most managers, however, do not oppose integration. For them, the cost of
the tax, especially the inducement it provides to debt finance, far outweighs the
benefits. Yet even these managers have been unwilling to lobby energetically
against the double tax. Integration would produce a substantial revenue loss
that would, they fear, be financed by the reduction of capital subsidies such as
ACRS. Much of this revenue loss would generate windfall gains to
shareholders while providing no benefit to managers. Many managers also
prefer tax breaks targeted to their firms to integration.
Integration proponents, we suggest, should consider two strategies to enlist
the support of corporate management. As a long-term strategy, reformers
should support efforts to remove impediments to shareholder voice. More
immediately, reformers should consider proposing versions of integration that
are acceptable to the majority of managers who are not opposed to integration
as such. To eliminate the concern that integration will be unnecessarily
expensive, integration proposals should provide subsidies only to new capital.
Reformers should also consider enlisting the aid of managers who want a
retained earnings trap by proposing plans that would preserve it. The most
politically promising integration scheme would be an imputation-credit method.
The ideal version of this method would avoid residual double taxation of
retained earnings with a DRIP. To reinforce the gap between shareholder and
individual rates, the system should not extend preferences to shareholders. By
preserving the earnings trap, this plan would maintain an important inefficiency
of the corporate tax but would have a much greater chance of passage than
plans that would eliminate it.
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In addition, reformers should oppose proposals that would enable
additional firms to avoid the double tax. Firms on which the double-level tax
imposes the greatest burden have in the past supported integration efforts.
Current tax law makes it unnecessarily easy for the managers of some publicly
held corporations to reduce the burden of two levels of tax while using the
earnings trap to justify earnings retention. The corporate tax weighs only
lightly on those managers who are also principal equity holders. Resisting
efforts to loosen the rules that apply to partnerships and closely held
corporations, we suggest, might induce this group to exert their considerable
influence on behalf of integration proposals.
More generally, we believe that the history of integration efforts holds a
lesson for those who seek to reform other aspects of the tax code. Effective
reform requires a grasp of the flaws in current law and a plan to remedy those
flaws. Reformers, however, must devise not only solutions, but solutions that
can realistically be enacted as law. In this effort, they would do well to invest
effort in understanding why the problem they seek to solve has persisted.
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APPENDIX A: TESTMONY AT INTEGRATION HEARINGS 175
TABLE A.1. House 197576
COMPANY ORLO CO .ETR INTEGRATION ACRS Low COP. ITCORGANIZATION RATE
METAL
MANUFACTURING
American Iron 18.5% Yes Yes Yes Yes
& Steel Inst.







for an Effective (360%) No Opinion Yes No Opinion Yes
Inv. Tax Credit
(& Chairman of




Machine Tool (36.0%) No Opinion Yes No Opinion Yes
Distribs. Ass'n
Associated
Equipment (36.0%) Yes Yes No Opinion Yes
Distribs.
Machinery
Dealers (36.0%) No Opinion No Opinion No Opinion Yes
Nat'l Ass'n
National Mach.
Tool Builders (36.0%) No Opinion Yes No Opinion Yes
Ass'n
175. Effective tax rates (ETR) figures on Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 are from Sanjay Gupta & Kaye
Newberry, Corporate Average Effective Tax Rates After the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 55 TAx NOTEs 689
(1982). Unless otherwise indicated, figures are from id. at 700 (tbl. 2), and are the Joint Committee on
Taxation (JCI) estimates for 1980, id. These are the earliest ETR estimates available. Figures in
parentheses indicate the JCT average for 1981-83. Because of the tax cuts in the early 1980s, these figures
probably significantly underestimate the effective tax rates the companies faced from 1975 to 1977.




COMPANY OR LOW CORP.OGANAON ETR INTEGRATION ACRS RP ITCORGANIZATION RATE
National Tool,











Air Transp. 14.5% No Opinion No Opinion No Opinion Yes
Ass'n




Association of 10.7% No Opinion Yes No Opinion Yes
Am. R.Rs.
Chicago &




Merrill Lynch (18.6%) Yes Yes Yes Yes
National Ass'n (18.6%) Yes No Opinion No Opinion No Opinion
of Inv. Clubs
Stockholders of (18.6%) Yes No Opinion No Opinion No Opinion
Am.
Cantor,
Fitzgerald (18.6%) Yes No Opinion No Opinion No Opinion
& Co.
National Ass'n
of Small Bus. (18.6%) Yes No Opinion No Opinion Yes
Inv. Cos.
KelsoBagt&elso Bangert (18.6%) Yes No No No
& Co.____ ____________ _ __
1995]
The Yale Law Journal




Forest Indus. 7.0% No Opinion No Opinion Yes No Opinion
Comm'n
Edward Knapp,
Forestry 7.0% No Opinion No Opinion Yes No Opinion
Consultant





















of Chain 35.1% Yes No Opinion Yes Yes
Drugstores
National Retail
Merchants 35.1% No Opinion Yes No Opinion Yes
Ass'n
CHEMICALS
Allied Chem. 30.3% No Opinion No Opinion No Opinion No Opinion
BROADCASTING _
Media General (17.7%) No Opinion No Opinion No Opinion Yes
[Vol. 105: 325
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Serv. (10.4%) No Opinion No Opinion Yes No Opinion
Indus. Ass'n
INSTRUMENTS
Beckman 40.7% Yes No Opinion No Opinion No Opinion
Instruments
BANKING
Chase N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes
Manhattan
City Nat'l Bank
& Trust of N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes
Columbus
First Nat'l Bank
of Oklahoma N/A Yes No Opinion No Opinion Yes
City
First Nat'l City N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank of N.Y.
Iowa Des




Councilfocil N/A Yes Yes Yes Yesfor Capital
Formation
Public Citizen
Tax Reform N/A No Opinion No Opinion No No
Research Group
New York
Citizens for N/A No Opinion No No No
Tax Reform
1995]
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 105: 325
COMPANY OR ETR INTEGRAION ACRS Lo COP. ITC
ORGANIZATION RATE
Tax Equity for N/A No Opinion No No Opinion No
Am.
Joseph A.




Chamber N/A No Opinion Yes No Opinion Yes
of Commerce
New York




TABLE A.2. Senate 1975'7




National Ass'n 18.5% Yes Yes Yes Yes
of Mfrs.
Machine &








Mining N/A Yes Yes No Opinion YesCongress Tax
Comm.
RUBBER
Rubber Mfrs. (47.3%) Yes Yes No Opinion Yes
Ass'n
TEXTILES
AmericanTeies N/A Yes Yes No Opinion YesTextiles Mfrs.
MISCELLANEOUS
U.S. Chamber N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes
of Commerce
American Inst.




Chambers of N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commerce
NationalDindl N/A Yes No Opinion No Opinion No OpinionDividend PlanII
177. Source: Tax Reform Act of 1975: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1976).
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TABLE A.3. House 1978'
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SecuritiesSedus.tAssn (18.6%) Yes No Opinion No Opinion No OpinionIndus. Ass'n
Public Sec. (18.6%) Yes No Opinion No Opinion No Opinion
Ass'n
RETAILING




AT&T (4.0%) Yes No Opinion No Opinion No Opinion
BANKING
American N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bankers Ass'n
MISCELLANEOUS
Arthur N/A Yes No Opinion No Opinion No Opinion
Andersen & Co.












Hopkins, Sutter, N/A Yes Yes No Opinion Yes
Mulroy, Davis
& Cromarite
Commonwealth N/A Yes Yes No Opinion Yes
Edison
178. Source: President's 1978 Tax Reduction and Reform Proposals: Hearings Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
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COMPANY OR LOW CORtP.ETR INTEGRATION ACRS ITC
ORGANIZAION RATE
New York State N/A Yes No Opinion No Opinion No Opinion
Bar Ass'n
Ernest S.
Christian, Jr., N/A Yes No Opinion No Opinion No Opinion
Patton, Boggs
& Blow
Municipal Fin. N/A No Opinion No Opinion No Opinion No Opinion
Officers Ass'n
TIAA-CREF N/A Yes No Opinion No Opinion No Opinion
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APPENDIX B: PUBLIC OPINION POLLS
TABLE B.1. Views on Corporate Tax
179
POLLING ORGANIZATION,
QUESTION RESPONSES SOURCE, AND RELEASE
DATE
"I would like to read some Favor 65% Hart and Teeter Research
elements of President (Bill) Oppose 29% Companies (NBCWSJ)
Clinton's economic plan. Do Not sure 6%
you favor or oppose... NBC News/Wall Street
increasing the corporate tax Journal
rate from thirty-four percent to
thirty-six percent?" 03/11/93
"I am going to read some Favor 62% Gallup Organization
economic proposals being Oppose 32% (Gallup)
considered by the (President Don't know/Refused to
Bill) Clinton administration, respond 6% Gallup/C.N.N.U.S.A.
For each one, please tell me Today
whether you would favor or
oppose it being included in 02/00/93
Clinton's economic plan....
Increasing the tax rate on
businesses and corporations.'
179. Source: Searches conducted in DIALOG, Poll database. The dates in this table appear in Westlaw
format to facilitate reproduction of our searches. For example, "00" indicates that a poll took place over




QUESTION RESPONSES SOURCE, AND RELEASE
DATE
"I'm going to mention some
specific things President (Bill)
Clinton proposed in his
economic address (to Congress
February 17, 1993) as part of
his program to improve the
nation's economy and reduce
the federal budget deficit. For
each, would you please tell me
if you favor or oppose this
particular part of his proposal.
... In order to help reduce the
federal budget deficit, Clinton
proposed raising the tax rate on
corporate profits over $10
million dollars, from 34 to 36
percent. Do you favor or
oppose this part of Clinton's
economic program? (If favor or








Los Angeles Tunes (LAT)
Los Angeles Tunes
02/00/93
"Do you favor or oppose the Favor 69% Yankelovich Clancy
following proposals to reduce Oppose 22% Shulman (YANKCS)
the federal budget deficit? Not sure 9%
Increasing taxes on TimelYankelovich Clancy
corporations." Shulman
02/18/88
"I am going to mention some Approve 67% ABC News/Washington
things that have been proposed Disapprove 32% Post (ABCWP)
to help balance the federal Don't know/No opinion 1%
budget, and for each please tell ABC News/Washington
me whether you approve or Post
disapprove of that
proposal.... Do you approve 06/29/87
or disapprove... raising taxes
on business corporations.., to
help balance the federal
budget?"
1995]
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POLLING ORGANIZATION,
QUESTION RESPONSES SOURCE, AND RELEASE
DATE
"As you know, the national Should be seriously Roper Organization (Roper)
deficit is estimated to reach considered 73%
approximately $175 billion in Should not be seriously Roper Report 85-1
1985. Here are some steps considered 21%
people have suggested could be Don't know 5% 02/08/85
taken to reduce the deficit. For
each one, would you tell me
whether you think it is a step
that should or should not be
very seriously considered as a
way of reducing the
deficit? ... An increase in
corporate income taxes."
"In order to reduce the federal Favor 62% Louis Harris & Associates
deficit, would you favor or Oppose 31% (HARRBW)
oppose... substantial Not sure 6%
increases in federal taxes on Business Week/Harris
corporations?"
01/30/84
"There have been many Strongly oppose 12% Opinion Research
suggestions made for Somewhat oppose 16% Corporation (ORC)
decreasing the federal budget Somewhat favor 25%
deficit, either by raising taxes Strongly favor 42% Public Opinion Index
or by cutting expenses. As I No opinion 5%
read each of these suggestions, 05/00/84
please tell me, for each,
whether you strongly favor,
somewhat favor, somewhat
oppose, or strongly oppose
it.... Raise the federal income
tax on corporations."
"In order to reduce the size of Willing 63% Yankelovich, Skelly and
the federal deficit, are you Not willing 31% White (YANK)
willing or not willing to see the Not sure 6%
government raise taxes on Time/Yankelovich, Skelly






QUESTION RESPONSES SouRcE, AND RELEASE
DATE
"In order to achieve a balanced Willing 59% Yankelovich, Skelly and
budget are you willing or not Not willing 34% White (YANK)
willing to see the government Not sure 7%
raise taxes on business and TimelYankelovich, Skelly
corporations or aren't you and White
sure?"
12/00/81
"Let us suppose the Favor 70% Hart and Teeter Research
government needed to raise Oppose 24% Companies (NBCWSJ)
taxes. For each of the Not sure 6%
following, please tell me if you NBC News/Wall Street
would favor or oppose raising Journal
that tax.... Increasing the tax
rate on corporations." 07/00/90
"(Various specific tax Favor 61% Louis Harris & Associates
proposals have been made to Oppose 33% (HARRBW)
reduce the federal deficit.) To Not sure 6%
cut the size of the budget Business Week/Harris
deficit, would you favor or
oppose... putting an income 01/30/84
tax surcharge of up to 10%
more of current taxes on
corporations?"
"President Carter has Favor 38% Louis Harris & Associates
recommended a series of tax Oppose 25% (HARRIS)
changes to the Congress. Let Not sure 37%
me read you some of the things Harris Survey
he is recommending. For each,
tell me if you favor or oppose 03/2378
that tax proposal.... Reduce
the general corporate income
tax rate from 48 percent to 44
percent by 1980."
"(Now let me ask you about Favor 44% Louis Harris & Associates
some specific provisions of the Oppose 46% (HARRBW)
new Reagan proposal for tax Not sure 10%
simplification. For each, tell Business Week/Harris Poll
me if you would favor or
oppose that provision.) ... A 06/17/85
gradual reduction of the
maximum corporate income tax
to 33%'
The Yale Law Journal
POLLING ORGANIZATION,
QUESTION RESPONSES SOURCE, AND RELEASE
DATE
"Now let me ask you about Favor 42% Louis Harris & Associates
some specific provisions of the Oppose 47% (HARRIS)
tax reform bill that is likely to Not sure 11%
be voted on by the House of Harris Survey
Representatives. For each
provision, tell me if you favor 11/25/85
or oppose it?... A gradual
reduction of the maximum
corporate income tax from 46
percent to 35 percent"
"From your personal Too high 21% Louis Harris & Associates
standpoint, which of these Too low 18% (HARRIS)
taxes do you feel are too high, About right 14%
which too low, and which Not sure 47% Harris Survey
about right? ... Federal
corporate taxes." 04/12173
"From your personal Too high 24% Louis Harris & Associates
standpoint, please tell me, for Too low 17% (HARRIS)
each tax that I read off to you, About right 12%
if you feel it is too high, too Not sure 47% Harris Survey
low, or about right.... Federal
corporate tax." 04114/77
"From your personal Too high 27% ABC News/Louis Harris &
standpoint, please tell me, for Too low 12% Associates
each tax that I read off to you, About right 17% (ABCHS)
if you feel it is too high, too Not sure 44%
low, or about right.... Federal Proposition 13
corporate tax."
06/1978
"In order to spur economic Should 24% Louis Harris & Associates
growth, do you think the Should not 73% (HARRBW)
federal government should... Not sure 3%
reduce the income tax that Business Week/Harris Poll





QUESTION RESPONSES SOURCE, AND RELEASE
DATE
"Frequently on any Favor 31% Roper Organization
controversial issue there is no Opposed to 48% (ROPER)
clear cut side that people take, Have mixed feelings/
and also frequently solutions Don't know 21% Roper Report 78-2
on controversial issues are
worked out by compromise. 03/00/78
But I'm going to name some
different things, and for each
one would you tell me whether
on balance you would be more
in favor of it, or more opposed
to it?... More tax breaks for
corporations so business can
expand."
"Many suggestions have been Strongly favor 33% Opinion Research
made for ways to keep the Mildly favor 33% Corporation (ORC)
country growing fast enough Mildly oppose 16%
economically. As I read some Strongly oppose 14% Public Opinion Index
of them, please tell me whether No opinion 4%
you strongly favor, mildly 09/30/79
favor, mildly oppose, or
strongly oppose each idea....
Reduce corporate income taxes
so that business will have
money to expand and provide
jobs."
"Many suggestions have been Strongly oppose cuts 18% Opinion Research
made for ways to keep the Mildly oppose 13% Corporation (ORC)
country growing fast enough Mildly favor 28%
economically. As I read some Strongly favor 34% Public Opinion Index
of them, please tell me whether No opinion 7%
you strongly favor, mildly 07/31/78
favor, mildly oppose, or
strongly oppose each idea....
Reduce corporate income taxes
so that business will have
money to expand and provide
jobs."
1995]
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POLLING ORGANIZATION,
QUESTION RESPONSES SOURCE, AND RELEASE
DATE
"(Here are some possible ways
for the government to raise
money to reduce the federal
budget deficit. For each, please
tell me whether you support or
oppose it.) ... higher corporate
taxes. (If 'Support,' ask:)
Would you support higher
corporate taxes even if
businesses passed on the
expense to consumers by
raising the prices for their
goods?"
Support even if businesses
passed on the expense to
consumers 40%
Support, but not if
businesses passed on the
expense 23%
Support, but don't know if
would still support if
businesses passed on the
expense 3%
Oppose 27%
Don't Know/No Answer if







TABLE B.2. Views on Dividend Taxation8 °
QUESTIONS RESPONSES POLLNG ORGANZAONS
AND RELEASE DATE
"Many suggestions have been Strongly oppose 20% Public Opinion Research
made for ways to keep the Somewhat oppose 26% Corporation (ORC)
country growing fast enough Somewhat favor 26%
economically. As I read some Strongly favor 20% Public Opinion Index
of them, please tell me whether No opinion 8%
you strongly favor, mildly 05/00/84
favor, mildly oppose, or
strongly oppose it....
Encourage individual
investment by eliminating the
tax that stockholders have to
pay on the dividends they
receive from companies."
"Many suggestions have been Strongly favor 26% Opinion Research
made for ways to keep the Mildly favor 28% Corporation (ORC)
country growing fast enough Mildly oppose 21%
economically. As I read some Strongly oppose 15% Public Opinion Index
of them, please tell me whether No opinion 10%
you strongly favor, mildly 09/30/79
favor, mildly oppose, or
strongly oppose each idea....
Reduce corporate income taxes
so that business will have more
money to expand and provide
jobs."
"Many suggestions have been Strongly oppose 12% Opinion Research
made for ways to keep the Mildly oppose 20% Corporation (ORC)
country growing fast enough Mildly favor 28%
economically. As I read some Strongly favor 24% Public Opinion Index
of them, please tell me whether No opinion 16%
you strongly favor, mildly 07/31/78
favor, mildly oppose, or
strongly oppose each idea....
Reduce corporate income taxes
so that business will have more
money to expand and provide
jobs."
180. Source: Searches conducted in DIALOG, Poll database. The dates in this table appear in Westlaw
format to facilitate reproduction of our searches. For example, "00" indicates that a poll took place over
the course of a given month.
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QUEST1ONS RESPONSES POLLING ORGANIZATIONS
AND RELEASE DATE
"The elimination of several More fair 46% Gordon S. Black
deductions has been proposed Neither 5% Corporation (GBUSA)
in order to reduce the Federal Less fair 34%
Income Tax Rates. As I read Don't know/refused 15% Gordon S. Black/U.S.A.
the following list, tell me if Today
you think it will make the tax
system more fair or less fair. 06/00/85
First, elimination of deductions
for: ... the $100-per-person
exemption on dividend
income."
"Economic prosperity for all
requires substantial and
continuing investments in new
plants and equipment. For
example, it takes about $35,000
in investment to provide a job
for one new worker-the truck
he drives, the factory he works
in, the machines he operates,
and so forth. A number of
economists have expressed
concern about a shortage of
investment capital and where
the new money needed will
come from. Here are five ways
the amount of capital available
for investment in new plants
and equipment could be
increased. I'd like your reaction
to each of these ideas. ...
Reduce taxes on dividends so
that more people will buy
stock.... Do you think that's
a good idea or is not a good
idea?
"Should we reduce or eliminate
the taxes people pay on the
dividends so that more people
will buy stocks and companies
will have more money to invest
in new plants and equipment?"
Good idea 62%








POLLING ORGANIZATIONSQUESTIONS I AND RELEASE DATE
"Economic prosperity for all
requires substantial and
continuing investments in new
plants and equipment. For
example, it takes about $35,000
in investment to provide a job
for one new worker-the truck
he drives, the factory he works
in, the machines he operates,
and so forth. A number of
economists have expressed
concern about a shortage of
investment capital and where
the new money needed will
come from. Here are five ways
the amount of capital available
for investment in new plants
and equipment could be
increased. I'd like your reaction
to each of these ideas. (Card
shown respondent.) First,
reduce taxes on dividends so
that more people will buy
stock. Do you think that's a
good idea or is not a good
idea?"
Good idea 60%
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QU S RESPONSES [POLLING ORGANIZATIONS I AND RELEASE DATE
"Economic prosperity for all
requires substantial and
continuing investments in new
plants and equipment. For
example, it takes about $25,000
in investment to provide a job
for one new worker-the truck
he drives, the factory he works
in, the machines he operates,
and so forth. A number of
economists have expressed
concern about a shortage of
investment capital and where
the new money needed will
come from. Here are five ways
the amount of capital available
for investment in new plants
and equipment could be
increased. I'd like your reaction
to each of these ideas....
Reduce or eliminate the taxes
people have to pay on the
dividends they receive from
shares of stocks so that more
people will buy stocks and
companies will have more
money to invest in new plants
and equipment from the sale of
their stock.... Do you think
that's a good idea or is not a
good idea?"
Good idea 58%








QUESTIONS RESPONSES POLLNG ORGANIZTONSF I AND RELEASE DATE
"Economic prosperity for all
requires substantial and
continuing investments in new
plants and equipment. For
example, it takes about $25,000
in investment to provide a job
for one new worker-the truck
he drives, the factory he works
in, the machines he operates,
and so forth. A number of
economists have expressed
concern about a shortage of
investment capital and where
the new money needed will
come from. Here are five ways
the amount of capital available
for investment in new plants
and equipment could be
increased. I'd like your reaction
to each of these ideas....
Reduce or eliminate the taxes
people have to pay on the
dividends they receive from
shares of stocks so that more
people will buy stocks and
companies will have more
money to invest in new plants
and equipment from the sale of
their stock."
"(Now let me ask you about
some specific provisions of the
new Reagan proposal for tax
simplification. For each, tell me
if you would favor or oppose
that provision.) ... Allow




proposal to allow corporations
to deduct 10% of dividend
payments to shareholders?"
Good idea 53%
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TABLE B.3. Views on Double Taxation'8'
QUESTIONS RESPONSES POLLING ORGANIZATION
AND DATE
"At present corporations are taxed Pay tax 51% Opinion Research
on the profits they pay out to Free from tax 35% Corporation (ORC)
stockholders in dividends. Do you No opinion 14%
think that the stockholders should Public Opinion Index
then pay income tax on the
dividends, or should these be free 01/00/49
from tax?"
"Do you see any advantage to the No 64% Opinion Research
country as a whole in reducing or Will attract more Corporation (ORC)
removing the tax on dividends? investment capital 10%
What?" Would put more money Public Opinion Index
in circulation 4%
Give more money to 01/00/49
expand 2%




[Adds to more than
100% due to multiple
responses]
"Do you think stockholders should Yes 80% Opinion Research
pay income taxes on dividends the No 12% Corporation (ORC)
same as they pay on other income Don't know 8%
they get?" Public Opinion Index
01/00/49
"It is often said that money made Yes 36% Opinion Research
by corporations is taxed No 46% Corporation (ORC)
twice--once when the corporation Don't know 18%
pays a tax on profits, and again Public Opinion Index
when the individual pays an
income tax on the dividends he 03/00/45
receives. Have you heard anything
about that?"
181. Source: Searches conducted in DIALOG, Poll database. The dates in this table appear in Westlaw
format to facilitate reproduction of our searches. For example, "00" indicates that a poll took place over
the course of a given month.
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Corporate Taxation
QUESTIONS RESPONSES POLLNG ORGANIZATION
AND DATE
"It is often said that money made Yes 32% Opinion Research
by corporations is taxed No 23% Corporation (ORC)
twice-once when the corporation Don't know 45%
pays a tax on profits, and again Public Opinion Index
when the individual pays an
income tax on the dividends he 03/00/45
receives. Do you think this
situation is all right or that
something ought to be done about
it?"
"In addition to the tax cuts the Favor 63% Louis Harris &
President called for in his speech Oppose 29% Associates (HARRIS)
before Congress, President Reagan Not sure 8%
and his economic advisors are Harris Survey
working on another tax cut
program designed to stimulate 03/12/81
investment to make the economy
grow ... Would you favor or
oppose... [e]liminating double
taxation on corporation profits, by
ending taxes paid by stockholders
on dividends they receive, on
which corporations have already
paid income tax, in order to
stimulate more investment by
individuals?"
"People who get income from At both corporate and Roper Organization
dividends on stocks they own in personal level 37% (ROPER) (Sponsor H &
publicly held corporations pay Only corporations R Block)
personal income taxes on those should pay taxes 35%
dividends that are in excess of Only people receiving American Public & The
$100. Corporations paying the dividends should pay Income Tax System 1978
dividends have already paid income taxes 15%
taxes on those dividends, since they Don't know 14% 07/00178
represent profits of the corporations
and corporate profits are taxed.
How do you think dividends should
be taxed-at both the corporate and
the personal level as they now are,
or that only the corporation should
pay taxes on dividends, or that only
the people receiving the dividends
should pay taxes on them?"
1995]

